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Resumo  
 
No mercado farmacêutico, a prevalência de empresas multi-produto e a co-
existência de diversos sub-mercados permitem-nos estudar vários aspectos acerca da 
gestão de portfolios de produtos. Em termos de política, as decisões sobre portfolios são 
importantes porque elas implicam a disponibilidade de produtos, que é normalmente 
uma das preocupações das autoridades de Saúde. Assim sendo, nós concentramos a 
nossa análise em dois tipos de decisão: a decisão de lançar um produto no mercado e a 
decisão de retirar um produto do portfolio. 
Este trabalho tem dois objectivos principais: primeiro, testar se a evidência de 
outras indústrias se aplica ao mercado farmacêutico; e segundo, testar os efeitos da 
regulação sobre as decisões de portfolio das empresas.  
Começamos por estudar como as empresas decidem quando e onde lançar novos 
produtos (Essay 1: Product Entry in Pharmaceutical Markets). Depois, estudamos as 
decisões de retirada de produtos. Fazemos isso estudando as decisões de retirada de 
medicamentos de marca, em Portugal (Essay 2: Survival of Branded Drugs), e 
comparando as decisões de retirada de produtos em Portugal, Suécia e Nova Zelândia 
(Essay 3: Survival of Pharmaceutical Products: a Cross-Countries Analysis). 
 As nossas principais conclusões são: a concorrência intra-empresa e inter-
empresa são importantes para explicar a entrada de produtos, tal como esperado, mas os 
seus efeitos sobre a retirada de produtos não são claros; o sistema de preços de 
referência não tem um efeito claro sobre a probabilidade de saída de produtos mas tem 
um efeito positivo sobre a probabilidade de entrada de produtos.  
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Abstract 
 
Within the pharmaceutical market, the prevalence of multi-product firms and the 
co-existence of various sub-markets enable us to study several aspects about 
management of product portfolios. Portfolio decisions are important for policy purposes 
because they implicate the availability of products, which is usually one of the concerns 
of Health authorities. Therefore, we concentrate our analysis on two types of portfolio 
decisions: the decision to launch new products and the decision to withdraw existing 
products.  
 This work has two main purposes: first, to test if evidence for other markets 
applies to pharmaceutical markets; and second, to test the effects of regulation on 
portfolio decisions, by firms.  
We start by studying how firms decide when and where to launch new products 
(Essay 1: Product Entry in Pharmaceutical Markets). Then, we study the decisions on 
withdrawing the existing products. We do it by studying the exit decisions of branded 
drugs, in Portugal (Essay 2: Survival of Branded Drugs), and by comparing the exit 
decisions of pharmaceutical products on Portugal, Sweden and New Zealand (Essay 3: 
Survival of Pharmaceutical Products: a Cross-Countries Analysis).  
 Our main conclusions are: intra-firm and inter-firm competitions are important 
to explain the entry of pharmaceutical products, as expected, but the effects on 
product’s exit are more misleading; the reference price system has no clear effect on 
exit probability, but it affects positively product entry.  
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Preamble 
 
With the following essays, we intend to better understand the decisions on 
product portfolios in pharmaceutical markets. The initial driving force for this work was 
to study competition and market structure on pharmaceutical markets. The singularity 
and complexity of pharmaceutical markets drove us to focus our research on firm’s 
choices about their own portfolios.  
We observe that almost all pharmaceutical firms are, at some point of their life 
cycle, multi-product firms. Unlike other industries where multi-product firms are 
predominant, on pharmaceutical industry firms may have a portfolio where substitute, 
complementary or independent products co-exist. In fact, pharmaceutical markets can 
be divided into sub-markets, according with the therapeutic use of the products and/or 
their chemical composition. These sub-markets can be more or less close to each other 
and the number of sub-markets increases as scientific research and technology deliver 
new medicines. 
Within pharmaceutical markets, the dispersion of portfolio has another 
implication than the diversity on the degree of substitution or complementary between 
products: it implicates that products from the same firm face different market structures. 
In fact, a firm may simultaneously be monopolist in one sub-market (protected or not by 
a patent) and face competition in other sub-market (from branded or generic products or 
both). Also, firms may encounter specific regulation for each sub-market.  
The prevalence of pharmaceutical multi-product firms and the co-existence of 
various sub-markets enable us to study several aspects about management of product 
portfolios. Portfolio decisions are important for policy purposes because they implicate 
the availability of products, which is usually one of the concerns of Health authorities. 
Therefore, we concentrate our analysis on two types of portfolio decisions: the decision 
to launch new products and the decision to withdraw existing products.  
 This work has two main purposes: first, to test if evidence for other markets 
applies to pharmaceutical markets; and second, to test the effects of regulation on 
portfolio decisions.  
We start by studying how firms decide when and where to launch new products 
(Essay 1: Product Entry in Pharmaceutical Markets). Then, we study the decisions on 
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withdrawing the existing products. We do it by studying the exit decisions of branded 
drugs, in Portugal (Essay 2: Survival of Branded Drugs), and by comparing the exit 
decisions of pharmaceutical products on Portugal, Sweden and New Zealand (Essay 3: 
Survival of Pharmaceutical Products: a Cross-Countries Analysis). Two main 
econometric frameworks were used: for Essay 1, a selection model applied to firm-
month panel data; and for Essays 2 and 3, a survival model applied to product-month 
panel data.  
We leave the specificities and particular results of each of the Essays for the 
main text, but we want to highlight some major outcomes. Even though their 
differences, the three essays have some common points.  
All essays discuss and compare the impact of intra-firm competition 
(competition between products within the firm’s portfolio) and inter-firm competition 
(competition between products from different firms), both on entry and exit decisions. 
While intra-firm and inter-firm competitions are important to explain the entry of 
pharmaceutical products, as expected, the results for product’s exit are more 
misleading. Intra-firm competition is important to explain the survival of branded drugs 
in Portugal (Essay 2), but not to explain the survival of drugs in the three countries 
under analysis (Essay 3). However, results on Essays 2 and 3 cannot be directly 
compared because Essay 2 is for branded drugs and Essay 3 is for all drugs. We believe 
that the differences on intra-firm competition effects derive from that: branded drugs 
suffer more the effect of intra-firm competition than generic drugs (included on Essay 
3). In fact, after to patent expiration, the firm may gain on substituting the branded drug 
by a generic similar, especially if the reimbursement system is more favourable for 
generic drugs.  
One result that is common to Essay 2 and Essay 3 is the difference between 
survival odds of prescription and non-prescription drugs. The results are consistent: 
under the same circumstances, non-prescription drugs have a higher probability of 
surviving when compared with prescription drugs. Usually, non-prescription drugs 
have not to be conformed to heavy regulation and reimbursement rules as prescription 
drugs. So, this is a signal that market regulation pressure firms to increase product 
turnover. 
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Another common topic is the impact of the reference price system on portfolio 
decisions. There is a vast literature on reference price systems, but none of the previous 
work was about portfolio decisions. We find that the reference price system has no 
clear effect on exit probability; but it affects positively product entry. The reference 
price system creates opportunities for cheaper medicines to entry, although without 
“expulsing” the existing medicines. We suppose that the effects on existing products 
should be observed on prices and market shares, two variables that are not available for 
this work.  
We innovate on several aspects with this work. First, we perform a simultaneous 
analysis of the decision on when and where to launch new products. There is literature 
on the firm’s decisions on international diffusion of pharmaceutical drugs, but not how 
pharmaceutical firms decide about their portfolio’s dispersion within a single-country. 
Second, we applied a single-country analysis for product survival to a pharmaceutical 
market (the Portuguese market). Similar studies exist for other industries, but none for 
the pharmaceutical market. Furthermore, we do not limit our analysis to the dynamics 
of exit, but we also consider the possibility of transforming a product, during its 
lifetime, from branded to generic drug. Third, we extend the analysis of product 
survival to a cross-countries study, while all similar studies about product survival were 
single-country analysis.  
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Essay 1: Product Entry in Pharmaceutical Markets 
 
1. Introduction 
The aim of this paper is to explain the choice between launching products close 
to existing ones (concentration) and launching products in completely new markets 
(diversification). In this process, firms have to make two sequential decisions: first, 
whether or not to launch new products; and second, if they enter in new markets or 
concentrate in markets in which they already sell products. We use the Brander and 
Eaton (1984) model as a theoretical framework to address this issue. This model 
develops a sequential game of product entry decisions by multi-product firms: in the 
first stage, firms decide how many products they are going to launch (“the launch 
decision”); in the second stage, firms decide in which markets they launch the products 
(“the line decision”), and, finally, in the third stage, firms make “the output decisions”. 
The authors show that, under different conditions, it is possible to have two 
equilibriums: one of market segmentation (firms concentrate in a part of the product 
spectrum) and other of market interlacing (different firms produce close substitutes). 
They also show that monopoly power and potential entry are important determinants for 
launching decisions by firms.  
 This model is particularly appropriate for pharmaceutical markets for the 
following reasons: 1) pharmaceutical firms are usually multi-product firms; 2) the 
pharmaceutical market can be divided in several almost independent sub-markets (in the 
Portuguese case, we divide the pharmaceutical market in 224 sub-markets, 
corresponding to pharmacological subgroups within the same therapeutic subgroup); 3) 
monopoly power and potential entry can be related with the existence of patents. 
This topic was not object of analysis within the pharmaceutical market. 
However, portfolio management is a key element to understand the availability of 
medicines in certain markets. 
We apply a selection model that enable us to simultaneously study both 
decisions (“the launch decision” and “the line decision”) using explanatory variables 
that characterize the market, the firms and the regulatory framework.  
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We find that the market size has a positive effect on product launches. Also, we 
find empirical evidence that, as firms repeat the strategic game of launch and line 
decisions, the market structure tends to become interlaced. We show that firm 
heterogeneity, ignored by Brander and Eaton, is important to explain the final market 
structure. Regulation concerning entry and competition is important to explicate the 
“launch decision”, but not to explicate the “line decision”. 
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant 
literature on both product entry and product entry in pharmaceutical markets. In section 
3, we summarize and discuss the Brander and Eaton model. Section 4 describes the 
data. Section 5 has parametric estimations and the discussion of results. In the last 
section, we draw our main conclusions.  
 
 
2. Background  
 
2.1 Literature on product entry 
Literature about product selection for multi-product firms can be divided into 
two categories: demand side models and cost side models, with the latter usually 
focused on the importance of “economies of scope”. While cost-side models propose 
that firms become multi-product in order to exploit economies of scope, demand-side 
theories defend that, even in the absence of those economies, there can be room for 
multi-product firms because of demand interactions between products. If so, firms 
would benefit from producing a range of products.    
This paper is based on a “demand side model” developed by Brander and Eaton 
(1984). Products differentiate from each other through substitution effects: intra-group 
cross elasticity is higher than inter-group cross elasticity. Two possible outcomes are 
derived: market segmentation (each firm controls certain parts of the product spectrum) 
and market interlacing (in which close substitutes are produced by different firms). The 
model is discussed, in depth, in the next section.  
Other researchers keep on the analysis of multi-product launch decisions, 
beyond the traditional framework of economies of scope. Raubitschek (1987) examines 
the decision of multi-product firm on launching new brands within the same market, 
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where there is no entry. The model has the limitation of ignoring the cross effects 
between brands of the same firm. Therefore, it assumes that firms do not exploit 
portfolio externalities. The problem of pharmaceutical firms is even more complicated, 
because the market is divided in sub-markets: they have to decide to launch products in 
new sub-markets or to launch products in sub-markets where they already have 
products.  
Shaked and Sutton (1990) propose a model to test the relationship between 
market size and concentration. The equilibrium is the result of the balance between: the 
expansion effect (demand for the new product net of any loss of sales incurred on own 
existing products; therefore, incumbents have less incentive to launch new products 
then entrants) and the competition effect (the gap between prices under a competitive 
outcome and those under a monopolistic one; therefore, incumbents have higher 
incentives to launch new products). The degree of substitutability between products 
affects both effects. When assuming sequential entry, preemption of the market is not 
always the equilibrium. The expansion effect assumed by Shaked and Sutton (1990) is 
close to the demand growth considerations of Brander and Eaton (1984), when these 
authors discussed that under too low or too high demand the outcome of their model 
would not prevail.  
An alternative way of designing the groups of products is to associate each 
group to a firm. For markets with strong firm-brand effects and where all products are 
not very distant to each other, this choice may be adequate. For the second reason, this 
approach is not satisfactory for the pharmaceutical market, where products vary from 
perfect substitutability to total independence1. However, the insights from Anderson and 
De Palma (1992) and Allanson and Montagna (2005) can be useful to understand the 
decision on the first stage of the Brander and Eaton (1984) model. For the three papers, 
the two outcomes are the total number of firms (or nests) and the number of products of 
each firm. The first two papers show that market equilibrium implies too much firms 
and each firm provides too few products. The latter shows that two results are possible: 
one with many firms offering few products (usually, on “young” industries); and the 
other with few firms offering many products (usually, on “mature” industries).  
                                                
1
 Despite that the approach of Anderson and De Palma (1992) and Allanson and Montagna (2005) is not 
ours; we do not ignore firm-brand effects on our empirical analysis since we include it as a fixed effect 
for each firm.  
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Berry (1992) focuses on two aspects relevant for profitability on a new market: 
the strategic interaction between firms and firm heterogeneity. This latter issue was 
ignored by previous literature (that usually consider that firms are homogeneous), 
because of the complexity brought by heterogeneity. The application to airlines industry 
shows that firm heterogeneity is important to explain entry patterns. In the Brander and 
Eaton (1984) model, the only source of firm heterogeneity is the existing portfolio that 
can be different. As Berry (1992), we intend to control for other differences between 
firms.  
Finally, Burton (1994) made an empirical application of Brander and Eaton 
(1984). However, his work focuses on the use of a characteristics approach in which 
products are valued for their inherent characteristics, and he only analyses the “line 
decision” stage. Unlike this, our work will include both the decisions on the number of 
products and the lines of products.  
 
2.2 Literature on entry in pharmaceutical markets 
Literature on entry in pharmaceutical markets is mainly about generic drugs 
entry decision or on the international diffusion of innovation. For both issues, studies 
usually try to explain how market characteristics and regulation influence launches of 
generics or innovations.  
Studies on generic drugs entry (e.g., Caves et al., 1991; Grabowski and Vernon, 
1992; Scott Morton, 1999, 2000; Bergman et al., 2003) typically focus on the effects of 
generic drugs entry or on the effects of entry deterrence by incumbents (producers of 
branded drugs). Price effects and market structure effects of generic drugs entry are 
broadly covered by the literature. The results have different policy implications for 
regulators in order to stimulate competition. 
Another topic covered by literature is international diffusion of innovation (e.g., 
Acemoglu and Linn, 2004; Danzon, Wang and Wang, 2005; Grabowski and Wang, 
2006). Several studies focus on subjects such as: time to launch in new markets after the 
first launch or which markets are more attractive to innovative firms. Results show that 
market size and market regulation are important to explain the introduction of an 
innovative product.  
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Close to our analysis of the “line decision”, Yu (1984) analyze the rate of entry 
on therapeutic drug markets, in United States between 1964 and 1974. However, her 
work is at the sub-market level, instead of firm level. She concludes that market growth 
is an incentive for entry, while product differentiation, market concentration and drug 
innovation are barriers to entry into therapeutic sub-markets.  
Few works use firm characteristics to explain product entry. Exceptions are Kyle 
(2006, 2007) analyzing how firms spread innovation through different countries. She 
finds a mix of effects to explain product entry strategies: market and regulation effects, 
firm effects and product effects. Firm effects, namely local and international experience 
and the number of products, are substantial to explain launch patterns.  
Our paper focuses on strategies of firms for one single country, divided in sub-
markets, and we do not distinguish if the product is a branded or a generic product, even 
though we control for the percentage of generics on firms portfolio. We study how 
market, firm and regulation characteristics affect the choice between concentration and 
diversification of portfolios, given that the firm decides to launch a new product. The 
role of market regulation, important component of the pharmaceutical markets, is also 
included. 
 
 
3. The model of Brander and Eaton (1984) 
 
We intend to empirically apply the Brander and Eaton (1984) model to the 
Portuguese pharmaceutical market. The market does not fulfill all the assumptions of 
the model. The authors discuss the sensibility of results to a change on assumptions but 
it is not proved nor even tested. The basics of the Brander and Eaton model are as 
following. 
The market has four possible products, grouped on two pairs.  Each pair includes 
two close substitutes and the products of each pair are more distant substitutes of the 
products of the other pair. In the pharmaceutical market each therapeutic sub-group is a 
“pair” of close substitutes. The differences on proximity of products imply that new 
products have more impact on demand for close substitutes than for distant ones. 
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The demand function is drawn from an addictive utility function with two parts: 
a quadratic function in the vector of quantities of the relevant products (X) and a 
numeraire good, m (representing all the other products demanded by consumers). The 
distance between products is defined by cross-price elasticity.    
mBXXaXu +−= '  
 
We will not assume any restriction on the number of possible products or groups 
of products, and we will not restrict the number of firms. Brander and Eaton also note 
that the two discussed outcomes (segmentation and interlacing) were only “two of many 
possibilities”, that could arise for the four-product framework or for any other number 
of products. However, we maintain the substitutability assumption - the only important 
distinction is if products are in the same sub-market or not.  
Firms decide sequentially: (i) how many products to produce; (ii) how many 
sub-groups to be in; and (iii) which quantity to produce. The implication is that firms 
decide price or quantity taking their own portfolios and the competitor’s portfolios as 
given. The game is solved backwards. Brander and Eaton argue that it would be 
acceptable to assume that the two first stages are not separated, but separation helps to 
understand all issues under consideration. Whatsoever, the main idea is that firms make 
the two firsts decisions given that there are profitable prices and quantities in the last 
stage.  
The profit function is the same for every firm (homogeneity in cost). It includes 
two types of costs, for each product: a constant marginal cost (c) and a fixed sunk cost 
(K). For firm i, with ni products:   
Kncqqp ijj
n
j
ji
i
−−=∑
=
)(
1
pi  
 
This formulation has three main limitations: first, it implies that all firms are 
equally efficient; second, it ignores cost differences between products, even if they 
belong to different sub-markets; and third, it ignores any scope economies for products 
in the same sub-market. The rational for using such a narrow cost formulation is that the 
analysis is focused on the demand side. Therefore, a new product has three effects on 
the profit of the firm: the negative effect of the sunk cost; the direct profit of the new 
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product and the impact of the new product on the profit of existing products. This last 
effect is higher if the new product is close to existing products and smaller if otherwise.  
We can discuss the implication of firm heterogeneity in costs. Heterogeneity in 
costs could be two folders: scope economies and differences in efficiency. Economies 
of scope would be an incentive for segmentation, as defended by Brander and Eaton, 
since firms would have an incentive to produce all the products of a group.  Differences 
in efficiency would be an incentive to diversification. In fact, the most efficient firm 
would become monopolist or quasi-monopolist for the sub-markets where she is 
present. Therefore, as demonstrated by Brander and Eaton, the monopolist has 
incentives to diversify.  
The outcome of the first decision, the number of products, is based on the 
assumption that demand is on an intermediate range: not so low that there is any sub-
market with no products in and not so high that all firms will be in all the sub-markets.  
The basilar Brander and Eaton model is applied to an oligopoly market structure. 
They show that concentration (and consequently, market segmentation) is expected to 
happen, under oligopoly, if the number of firms is fixed. In fact, if there is no potential 
entry, firms divide the market and each one provides products for different sub-markets. 
This equilibrium is robust for any sequence of decisions. Because they expect a non-
cooperative game at the last stage, they now that the negative impact of a close 
competitor is higher than a more distant one, therefore they have an incentive to 
“divide” the market.  
The outcome of the Brander and Eaton static game is questioned if the game is 
to be repeated. The authors expect that market segmentation would be replaced by 
market interlacing, if the game is repeated with an on-growing market. At the limit, if 
demand is big enough, all the firms sell all the products.  
The Brander and Eaton model is extended to other two scenarios: oligopoly, 
with potential entry, and monopoly. This set of market structures is adequate to study 
pharmaceutical markets where the sub-markets have different structures2. We may have 
monopolies or oligopolies with no potential entry (if all the substances in the same sub-
                                                
2 The usual is to have more than one firm in each therapeutic sub-group. In 1990, nearly 25% of the sub-
markets were monopolies. In 2006, the monopolies were less than 15% of all sub-markets. 
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market are under patent protection and it is not realist to assume that other substance 
enter on that sub-market) and monopolies or oligopolies with potential entry (after 
patent expiration). 
If entry is possible, under oligopoly, firms have an incentive to diversify 
(generating an interlaced market). Market interlacing is a more competitive structure 
and, thereafter, it is expected that it lead to lower prices, which will difficult entry. 
Marketing interlacing is effective as entry deterrence than market segmentation if there 
is a high enough difference between degrees of substitutability. If a firm is a 
monopolist, she has an incentive to diversify. The goal is to increase profits without 
damaging current demand. 
We explain the two decisions (launch and line), adding some variables in order 
to test the effects that are not in the basic model, but are suggested by the authors as 
probable to change outcomes. Three main sets of variables are used: firm 
characteristics, market characteristics and regulation variables. 
Since firms are equal in the basilar model, the expected result is symmetric 
(equal number of products with the same degree of substitutability, but not necessarily 
the same products). However, evidence shows that our market has very diverse firms. In 
order to capture these differences we introduce heterogeneity between firms. Three 
variables control for differences between firms: the percentage of generics within the 
portfolio; the time since the last launch; and, the age of the firm.  
In order to integrate the “monopoly effects”, we use two variables: the number 
of sub-markets where the firm is a monopolist and the degree of concentration of own 
products in the sub-markets. Following Brander and Eaton, we expect that firms with 
more monopolies or with heavily concentrate portfolios to follow a diversification 
strategy.  
 
 
4. Data 
 
We use data on pharmaceuticals marketed in Portugal until October 2006, from 
INFARMED3. Using data from that cross-sectional dataset, we construct a firm-month 
                                                
3
 INFARMED is the Portuguese public agency for pharmaceuticals.  
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panel covering the period between January 1990 and October 2006 (202 months). We 
choose this timeframe for two reasons: first, this represents almost 17 years, which 
seems sufficient to capture the main characteristics of the Portuguese pharmaceutical 
market; and second, for computational reasons. The dataset includes 669 firms. Table 1 
shows the descriptive statistics.  
Table 1: Descriptive statistics (firm-month observations) 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Month 82012 474.71 56.31 360 561 
Entry of Firm (month) 82012 269.31 174.47 -128 560 
Exit of Firm (month) 14061 520.39 23.13 472 561 
Products (total) 82012 3565.03 907.58 1745 4982 
Products, by Firm 82012 82.13 13.76 1 191 
Firms 82012 431.80 97.21 263 553 
New Products (total) 82012 24.72 14.09 0 62 
New Products, by Firm 82012 0.06 0.30 0 16 
Withdrawn Products (total) 82012 8.63 13.36 0 69 
Withdrawn Products, by Firm 82012 0.02 0.20 0 15 
% of Generics, by Firm 82012 6.88 22.16 0 100 
Concentration Index, by Firm 82012 0.53 0.38 0 1 
Monopolies, by Firm 82012 0.10 0.35 0 11 
New Sub-Markets, by Firm 82012 0.03 0.20 0 7 
Sub-Market Exits, by Firm 82012 0.01 0.13 0 8 
Sub-Markets, by Firm 82012 5.89 8.27 1 80 
Age of the Firm 82012 205.39 162.19 0 689 
If after January 1995 82012 0.79 0.41 0 1 
If after October 1999 82012 0.52 0.50 0 1 
If after December 2002 82012 0.30 0.46 0 1 
New Products=1 82012 0.04 0.21 0 1 
Entry in New Sub-Markets=1 82012 0.03 0.17 0 1 
Entry in New Sub-Markets=1, if New Products=1 3662 0.67 0.47 0 1 
Time since last launch 82012 45.60 45.95 1 202 
 
Variables, as the number of firms and products and product entries and product 
exits, reflect market evolution and market dynamics. We expect that a growing number 
of firms and products to be a signal of demand growth. From 1990 to 2006, the total 
number of products in the market grew almost linearly, as did the number of firms 
(Figure 1). There is a high correlation between the two variables (the Correlation 
Coefficient is of 0.99). Market dynamics are described by two variables: new products 
and withdrawn products. The number of products launched in the market, each month, 
had also grown. However, the pattern was more irregular. Product withdraws are only 
significant since 1998.  
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Figure 1: Market evolution 
 
Because pharmaceutical markets are heavily regulated, we also control for the 
impact of regulation changes on launch and line decisions, during the period under 
analysis.  
The first change is the introduction of the European centralized process, in 
January 1995. Before 1995, firms had to apply separately for each national market, 
within Europe. Since 1995, firms may choose between apply for each country or do a 
centralized application valid for all European Union member states, plus Iceland, 
Liechtenstein and Norway. This is expected to facilitate entry, because firms may get 
the necessary introduction authorizations for several countries with only one application 
process, lowering entry costs. It equals lowering K, in the Brander and Eaton model. 
Our variable “If after January 1995” is expected to have a positive effect on launch of 
new products. 
The second change in regulation, introduced in October 1999, is the obligation 
of carrying economic evaluation studies when asking for public co-payment. This is 
expected to deter entry for two reasons: it increases entry costs and it is expected that 
proposed prices are lower, decreasing market attractiveness. 
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And the third is introduction of the reference price system4, in December 2002, 
that is expected to increase price competition for close products and, therefore, to lead 
to concentration strategies. The effect on product launch may be positive due to the 
incentive for launching generic drugs that are protected with this new rule. 
We control for firm characteristics in order to account for firm heterogeneity. 
The first firm entered the market in 1949. The last one entered the market in September 
2006. Therefore, age of firms vary from 0 to 57 years.  
Firms have from one single product to 191 products, in the same month. The 
global market can be divided in several sub-markets. Within the original dataset, 
products were grouped according to their Anatomical Therapeutic Chemical (ATC) 
code. The ATC system is the drug classification system developed by the World Health 
Organization. In the ATC classification system, the drugs are divided into different 
groups according to the organ or system on which they act and their chemical, 
pharmacological and therapeutic properties5. The first 4 digits of the code give the 
ATC-4 code, which corresponds to the pharmacological subgroup that aggregate close 
substitutes, even if not with the same active substance. Each ATC-4 code corresponds to 
a sub-market, in our model. We identify 224 ATC-4 sub-markets. The number of sub-
markets (ATC-4), in which the firm is present, goes from 1 to 80 (Figure 2). One sub-
market, for firm-month observation, is the most frequent situation (35.48%). The firm-
month observations with more than 45 sub-markets represent only 0.64% of the 
database. Almost 60% of the firms were in more than one sub-market simultaneously, at 
some point of the period under analysis, while the remaining (276 firms) never were at 
more than one sub-market, and, within these, 247 firms never had more than one 
product. In fact, almost all the pharmaceutical firms were single-product when starting 
but the natural evolution is to become multi-product and with a diversified portfolio. 
 
Figure 2: Sub-markets, by firm-month 
                                                
4
 The Portuguese reference price system was defined as follow: for products chemically identical, the 
public co-payment is, at top, the co-payment for the most expensive generic substitute. For products with 
no generic substitutes, the public co-payment is a fixed percentage of the price.  
5
 For a full description of the ATC classification system, see http://www.whocc.no/atcddd/.  
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By firm, the maximum number of new products, in one single month, is 14. A 
firm entered on 7 new sub-markets utmost, in one single month. When the firm launch 
new products, she usually does it only in new ATC-4s (57%) or only in old ATC-4s 
(33%) (the remaining 10% of the cases are of simultaneous launch in new and old ATC-
4s). Every time there is entry in a new ATC-4 sub-market, we treat it as a diversification 
option even if simultaneously there is also an entry in existing sub-markets.  
 
Table 2: New Sub-markets and new products, by firm-month 
  New Sub-markets 
  0 1 2 3 4 5 7 Total 
0 78350 0 0 0 0 0 0 78350  
1 1056 1951 0 0 0 0 0 3007  
2 117 234 127 0 0 0 0 478  
3 25 57 34 8 0 0 0 124  
4 6 8 7 8 2 0 0 31  
5 3 3 1 3 0 0 0 10  
6 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 3  
7 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 3  
8 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1  
9 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 2  
10 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1  
14 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1  
N
ew
 
Pr
o
du
ct
s 
16 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1  
 Total 79559 2256 171 21 3 1 1 82012 
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Product withdraws and sub-market exits, by firm, are also accounted. Product 
withdraws that happened because of the end of the firm represent only 12.5% of the 
total of observations with product withdraws. Sub-markets exits that happened because 
of the end of the firm represent 17% of the total of observations with sub-market exits. 
Therefore, the end of products or sub-market exits does not entail the end of the firm. It 
is usually the result of a portfolio profit maximization decision.  
Pharmaceutical firms sell branded drugs or generic drugs or both. There is a 
dominance of firm-month observations (86.2%) with portfolios of branded drugs, 
exclusively. Though, firm-month observations with portfolios with just generic drugs 
are few (3.6%).  
Another variable that measures firm heterogeneity is a concentration index (CI). 
We compute the CI as follow: 
2
1
, Products Total
market-subon  Products
∑
=


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

=
n
k
k
tMonthiFirmCI  
 
This index measures the degree of sub-market concentration within the firm’s 
portfolio. A CI of zero means a completely dispersed portfolio and a CI of one means a 
completely concentrated portfolio. The mean value of the CI, in our sample, is 0.58, but 
with a large standard deviation. As expected there is a negative relation between the 
number of products and the index: larger firms have lower concentration indexes, e.g., 
diversified portfolios.  
The “Number of monopolies, by firm” varies from zero to eleven. However, the 
average value is low. The relation between the number of sub-markets where the firm is 
a monopolist and the number of own products is not as clear as for the CI.  
Independent variables, as market and firms variables, are lagged. In fact, entry 
decision is previous to entry, namely because of the duration of the authorization 
process. From the INFARMED’s reports, responsible for national authorizations, and 
the European Medicines Agency (EMEA)’s reports, responsible for central 
authorizations, the average time for the analysis of applications is usually higher than 12 
months. Therefore, we use a lag of 18 months. Because of this, we loose observations, 
using only observations posterior to June 1991.  
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5. Estimation and Discussion  
 
First, firms decide if they launch new products or not. After, they decide if that 
launch is to be on a new sub-market, diversifying its portfolio, or not. We assume: 
111
*
1 uxy += β  and 222*2 uxy += β . 1y  is 1 if the firm takes a profitable launching 
opportunity, that will increase profit by 0*1 >y , and zero otherwise. The same happens 
for 2y  (it is 1 if the firm takes a profitable opportunity for entering a new sub-market, 
that will increase profit by 0*2 >y , and zero otherwise).  
Entering in new sub-markets only happens if the firm launches new products. 
We know that 2y  is zero if 1y  is zero, but not the contrary. Despite we observe the 
values of 2y  for any value of 1y , we cannot ignore the selection problem. When 1y  is 
zero, we do not know if the reasons for not entering in new markets are the reasons for 
not launch new products or even if there were any new products 2y  would remain zero. 
Therefore, we assume that 0),( 122 ≠yxuE . In order, to obtain valid estimators of the 
coefficients, we use the two-step procedure developed by Heckman (1979): first, the 
selection regression (in our case for the variable ) is estimated by a probit; then, the 
results are used to correct the estimations of the regression for the variable 2y .  
 
 5.1 The launch decision 
We start by estimating the launch decision. The binary variable “New 
products=1” is 1y . All the regressions included two types of “fixed effects”: time 
effects, through binary variables for each month, and firm effects, through binary 
variables for each firm. Marginal effects for probit regressions are on table 3. 
 
Table 3: Marginal Effects 
 Probit I Probit II 
Products (total)   0.000*** 
  (0.001) 
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Firms 0.001***   
 (0.000)  
New Products (total) -0.001**  0.001*** 
 (0.018) (0.003) 
Withdrawn Products (total) -0.001*** -0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.002) 
Products, by Firm -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) 
New Products, by Firm 0.003** 0.003** 
 (0.016) (0.016) 
Withdrawn Products, by Firm -0.004 -0.004 
 (0.117) (0.117) 
Time since last launch 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
% of Generics, by Firm 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Sub-Markets, by Firm 0.002*** 0.002*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Concentration Index, by Firm -0.044*** -0.044*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Monopolies, by Firm -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.204) (0.204) 
Age of the Firm -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
(Age of the Firm)2  0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) 
If after January 1995 -0.008 0.023** 
 (0.675) (0.001) 
If after October 1999 0.023*** 0.002 
 (0.007) (0.850) 
If after December 2002 0.035*** 0.066*** 
 (0.007) (0.004) 
 
Notes: Dependent variable is one if the firm launched a new product, and zero otherwise. The marginal effects of the binary 
variables for month effects and firm effects are omitted.  P-values are in parentheses. Observations are 77205.  
*Significantly different from zero at the 10% level. ** Significantly different from zero at the 5% level. *** Significantly different 
from zero at the 1% level. 
  
The results are mainly according to our hypotheses. Market dimension effects 
are somehow difficult to isolate, because of high correlation between explanatory 
variables. That is the reason for the two regressions, one with the number of firms (I) 
and the other with the number of products (II). Nevertheless, we see that both variables 
have a positive effect on product launch, although very small. That is consistent with 
the notion that firms launch more products within bigger markets. Market dynamics are 
misleading to describe launch decisions. The variable “New Products (total)” has 
opposite effects from regression I to regression II. Product exits have a negative effect 
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on the launch decision, but it is approximately zero for the second regression. However, 
this is a signal that for declining markets there is less incentive for launch new products. 
The effect of regulation is not exactly as expected. Note that time effects are 
controlled. Doing so, we expected to control for changes that occurred over time, other 
than changes on regulation. “If after January 1995” is significant only for the second 
regression, where the coefficient is consistent with the assumption that the introduction 
of the European centralized process has a positive effect on product launch. The request 
of economic evaluation for public co-payment (“If after October 1999”) has a positive 
effect on entry. It was expected that this additional entry cost would have a negative 
effect on entry, which does not occur. One possible explanation is the existence of a 
reputation effect associated with the economic evaluation. If the benefit of this 
reputation effect exceeds the cost for evaluation, then firms have an incentive to launch 
products that are capable to succeed on evaluation. The introduction of reference price 
system has a positive effect on entry. In fact, it was an opportunity for generics. Also, 
firms may launch products chemically different from the existing ones in order to 
escape from the reference price system.  
Firm characteristics are important to explain the probability of product launches. 
Therefore, firm heterogeneity, despite ignored by Brander and Eaton (1984), must be 
included in the model. Firms with higher percentage of generics have higher probability 
of launch new products. Young firms are more willing to launch new products. 
Additionally, firms with more products are less probable of launching new products. 
Both effects seem to spread the idea of firm-life cycle: in the beginning of their life 
firms have fewer products and are willing to launch more; as time goes by and the 
portfolio enlarges, the odd of launches diminishes. Portfolio dynamics are accounted for 
the number of withdrawn products and new products, on the moment of decision, and 
the time since last entry. Only the two last variables are significant but only “New 
products, by firm” have a positive effect on product launch. Therefore, launch decisions 
do not seem to be a consequence of previous withdraws.  
Three variables account for dispersion or concentration of firm’s portfolio. The 
first is the number of sub-markets, by firm, which has a positive effect on product entry 
(one additional sub-market increases the probability of launch new products by 0.2%). 
The second is the concentration index that has a negative effect on product launch. That 
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is to say that firms with more disperse portfolios have a higher odd of launching 
products. The third, that has not a significant effect on product launch, is the number of 
sub-markets where the firm is a monopoly. Therefore, we may conclude that portfolio 
dispersion has a positive effect on the probability of product launch. In fact, experience 
on different sub-markets probably increases the ability to exploit other launching 
opportunities.  
 
5.2 The line decision 
The binary variable “Entry in New Sub-Markets=1, if New Products=1” is 2y . 
As before, all the regressions included time effects and firm effects. The marginal 
effects of the Heckman selection regressions are on table 4. 
 
Table 4: Marginal Effects 
  Heckman I Heckman II 
Products (total)   -0.000 
  (0.364) 
Firms -0.002   
 (0.537)  
New Products (total) -0.012** -0.003 
 (0.046) (0.532) 
Withdrawn Products (total) 0.004 0.002 
 (0.389) (0.652) 
Products, by Firm 0.014*** 0.014*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
New Sub-Markets, by Firm -0.070*** -0.070*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
Sub-Market Exits, by Firm -0.049 -0.049 
 (0.532) (0.532) 
Time since last launch 0.001 0.001 
 (0.273) (0.273) 
% of Generics, by Firm -0.002 -0.001 
 (0.441) (0.441) 
Sub-Markets, by Firm -0.033*** -0.033*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Concentration Index, by Firm -0.067 -0.067 
 (0.695) (0.695) 
Monopolies, by Firm 0.027 0.027 
 (0.353) (0.353) 
Age of the Firm 0.000 0.000 
 (0.845) (0.845) 
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(Age of the Firm)2  0.000** 0.000** 
 (0.043) (0.043) 
If after January 1995 0.382 -0.183 
 (0.622) (0.746) 
If after October 1999 0.070 0.373 
 (0.903) (0.573) 
If after December 2002 -0.203 -0.100 
 (0.332) (0.691) 
 
Notes: Dependent variable is one if the firm enter in a new sub-market, given that she had launched new products, and zero 
otherwise. The marginal effects of the binary variables for month effects and firm effects are omitted.  P-values are in parentheses. 
Observations are 77205, and the value of y2 is non-missing for 3443 observations.  
*Significantly different from zero at the 10% level. ** Significantly different from zero at the 5% level. *** Significantly different 
from zero at the 1% level. 
 
Market variables, such as the total number of products, the number of firms and 
products withdraws, have no impact on the “line decision”. On regression I, the effect of 
the number of new products is significant and negative. The impact of new products, 
whatever the sub-market they belong to, is contrary to what was expected. In fact, if we 
assume that product entries are a signal of market growth, we expected it to increase 
diversification and not the contrary.  
There is a positive effect of the number of products of the firm on sub-market 
entry. One additional product increases the probability to enter into new markets by 
1.4%, e.g., large firms disperse more than smaller ones. Therefore, if large firms occupy 
the entire market, the expected market structure is of market interlacing.  
Previous sub-market entry makes new sub-market entries less probable. Also, 
there is a negative effect of the number of sub-markets, where the firm already is, on 
diversification. Firms that are in less sub-markets, and firms that were not diversifying 
when deciding new launches, have higher probability of entering into new markets. 
That is consonant with the hypothesis of market dynamic: the repetition of the game 
makes that all firms will diversify, and market converge to an interlacing market. Sub-
market exits have no effect on sub-market entries. If sub-market entries were a 
consequence of sub-market exits, we could not say that the entry on new sub-markets 
would lead to a more diversified portfolio. In this case, we do not see a relation between 
previous exits and current entries.  
The number of monopolies has no effect on diversification or concentration. So, 
the Brander and Eaton conclusions do not apply because it seems that monopolists do 
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not increase profits through diversification. Also, other characteristics of firms have no 
influence on the “line decision”. In fact, firm heterogeneity seems to matter only for the 
“launch decision”.  
Despite regulation changes are important to explain the launch decision, the 
concentration / diversification decision suffers no effect from regulation. The most 
surprising is the absence of influence from the introduction of the reference price 
system (“If after December 2002”). It was expected that firms would change their 
portfolios in order to protect the existing products from aggressive competitors or to 
exploit new opportunities (for example, in the case of generics drugs).  
 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
Brander and Eaton (1984) find that markets with differentiate products and 
multi-product firms have two possible outcomes: market segmentation (each firm 
controls certain parts of the product spectrum) and market interlacing (in which close 
substitutes are produced by different firms). In this paper, we test this model in the 
context of the Portuguese pharmaceutical market. 
Usually, the pharmaceutical firms were single-product when starting but the 
natural evolution is to become multi-product and with a diversified portfolio. Product 
launches that are, simultaneously, entries in new sub-markets are common.  
We show that the “demand size effect” happens. As predicted by Brander and 
Eaton, firms launch more products as market grows. Also, there is evidence that, as 
firms repeat the strategic game of launch and line decisions, they diversify more and 
market structure becomes interlaced. Regulation only matters for the “launch decision”. 
Regulation affects the decision of launching new products, but not the decision of at 
which distance from the existing products of the firm. Therefore, we may conclude that 
the regulation measures analyzed did not change the substitution pattern within the sub-
markets and, consequently, did not change the incentives for concentration or 
diversification.  
Launch decisions do not seem a consequence of previous withdraws, as sub-
market entries are not a consequence of sub-market exits. However, our work does not 
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include the reverse analysis: if launches and entries have effect on future withdraws and 
exits, respectively. There is evidence that firm characteristics, ignored by Brander and 
Eaton, are important to explain the “launch decision”. However, the same is not proved 
for the “line decision”.   
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Essay 2: Survival of Branded Drugs  
 
1. Introduction 
 
The mainstream literature on the economics of entry and exit is focused on the 
decision by a firm with a portfolio of a single product. Usually, this analysis is reduced 
to a problem of location in relation to other firms, assuming that such firms also sell just 
one product (Bresnahan and Reiss (1990, 1991), Berry (1992)).  
However, multi-product firms face a much more complex set of decisions as 
they have to simultaneously choose the location of all the products of their portfolios 
and the composition of such portfolios.  
When firms may be present in several distinct sub-markets, sometimes even with 
more than one product in each of those sub-markets, product entry and exit becomes the 
result of a more complex portfolio’s profit maximization. Therefore, each product is 
likely to face two kinds of competition: the first, from substitutes produced by other 
firms (inter-firm competition); the second, from other products of the same firm (intra-
firm competition). Understanding which of these two forces is more relevant and under 
what circumstances is a question that has not been properly addressed. 
In reality, the literature on portfolio location for multi-product firms is still very 
scarce. Previous empirical studies have analyzed the driving forces of portfolio 
management. For example, Ruebeck (2005), Requena-Silvente (2005), and Greeinstein 
et al. (1998), found evidence of a relationship between greater sub-market intra-firm 
competition and a higher probability of product exit. Greeinstein et al. (1998) analyzed 
simultaneously entry and exit patterns, by sub-markets, showing that once a product is 
introduced, other products of that firm are more likely to exit. Two explanations are 
proposed: first, products exit because new and similar products are available; second, 
products enter because existing products are close to obsolescence. 
Another relevant feature on what drives products out of market is the 
disaggregation of product and firm effects. Identical products have different survival 
spells just because the firms that produce them have specific strengths that make 
survival more likely (Stavins, 1995; Asplund et al., 1999; Figueiredo et al., 2006). At 
the firm level, the scale effect is somewhat puzzling. Larger firms usually have 
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competitive advantages, due to scope and scale economies. However, with scarce 
resources, because of their minor weight in the total revenue of the firm, it is more 
probable that a large firm drops a product that, in a small firm, would be kept. In this 
domain, empirical results are dissonant. While Stavins (1995) found no evidence of 
scale effects on product survival, in the personal computer market, Asplund et al (1999) 
showed that, in the Swedish beer market, products from firms with high market shares 
have a higher probability of exit, and Figueiredo et al (2006) found little evidence that a 
firm’s size increases product survival, on the laser print industry. It is not clear if the 
dissonance of results is consequence of different methodological techniques or cost 
structure differences across industries.   
Pharmaceutical firms often sell a portfolio of products, which can be either for 
similar or different therapeutic categories, branded or generics, innovative or mere 
copies. Branded drugs are often divided into two kinds: those who are, or were, 
innovative drugs; and those that were launched with a brand name, but are merely 
copies of innovative drugs. In Portugal, for example, the proliferation of copies was one 
of the main reasons for authorities to allow, in 2001, the transformation of branded 
drugs into generic drugs1. However, this regulatory change only became effective with 
new legislation in October 2003. Therefore, two kinds of generics can be identified: 
those who were introduced in the market as such, and those that were introduced in the 
market as brands, and later transformed. Those specificities make the Portuguese 
pharmaceutical market an interesting field of research on brand and multi-product 
competition and market structure. 
The pharmaceutical market is divided into several sub-markets, each one of 
them with its own characteristics. A single firm, present in several sub-markets, may 
face different market structures, and may have a specific relative position in those sub-
markets. Therefore, in order to study branded drugs survival, it is necessary to 
incorporate all those questions into a conceptual framework. 
Furthermore, in pharmaceutical markets, firms are always facing new 
technological opportunities, with a continuous expansion of the product space. 
Therefore, it is expectable to observe frequent product turnover. Hence, the role of 
innovation is of striking importance and we will analyze the existence of a survival 
                                                
1
 Preamble to the Decree-Law no 249/2003, 11 October 2003.  
27 
 
advantage of innovative products. Figueiredo et al (2006) showed that innovative 
products last longer on the market. 
The aim of this work is to analyze why firms decide to drop a branded drug, and 
how the possibility of transformation into a generic drug changes the product life cycle. 
We model branded drug survival assuming that brands may disappear by exiting the 
market or by being transformed into generics. In this perspective, product exit in 
pharmaceutical markets has not been a subject of analysis yet, despite the existence of 
several studies about entry, namely the impact of generics entry over price and market 
share of branded drugs (Caves et al., 1991; Frank et al., 1997; Kyle, 2006, 2007). In this 
paper, we study the impact of regulatory changes over branded drug’s survival. Three 
regulatory changes are included: first, in September 2000, the introduction of a major 
public reimbursement for generics2, relative to branded drugs; second, in December 
2002, the introduction of the reference-price system of reimbursement for some 
products3; and third, in October 2003, the possibility of transforming branded drugs into 
generics. All three measures intended to improve the substitution of branded drugs for 
generics, in order to achieve a reduction of public expenses.  
The main contribution of this paper is two-folded. First, we do not limit our 
analysis to the dynamics of exit, but we also consider the possibility of transforming a 
product, during its lifetime, from brand to generic drug; second, we analyze a market 
with a heavy regulatory framework and see how the changes in regulation, described 
above, change branded drug survival. 
We find evidence of scale and scope effects in the evaluation of “death” rates. 
Additionally, there is evidence that number of products from competing firms have 
lower impact on exit and transformation of branded drugs. We also find that regulation 
plays an important role on the decision to drop out or to transform a branded drug. On 
markets not so regulated on prices and selling rules, as non-prescription drugs market, 
branded drugs have higher survival rates. After October 2003, with the complete 
regulatory framework implemented, branded drugs have a lower probability of 
surviving than before.  
                                                
2
 The reimbursement rates are 10 percentage points higher if the product is a generic.  
3
 The reference-price is established if the product has, at least, one generic substitute. The reference-price 
is the price of the most expensive generic.  
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 formulates the 
hypothesis to be tested. In section 3, we describe the data, and present the results of 
non-parametric estimation. Section 4 has parametric estimations and the discussion of 
results. In the last section, we draw our main conclusions.  
 
 
2. Hypotheses for the determinants of branded drugs survival 
 
We assume a multiproduct firm with j products and with a profit function pi(·), in 
a context of scarce resources. The jth product exits if one of two alternatives happens. 
First, if the firm has lower profits with that product in its portfolio, than without it: 
pi(1, 2, …, j) <  pi(1, 2, …, j-1). 
Second, when the introduction of new products requires the exit of product j, if a 
portfolio with product j and no new product is less profitable than a portfolio with new 
products and without product j:  
pi(1, 2, …, j) <  pi(1, 2, …, j-1, j+1, …) 
Therefore, the product will exit the market if it becomes unprofitable or if 
shifting scarce resources from its production to the production of new products 
increases the firm’s profitability. We are interested in the analysis of the causes of the 
decrease of absolute or relative profitability of a product, and consequently its exit from 
the market. 
According to the product life cycle theory (Levitt, 1965; Cox, 1967), products 
pass through four distinct phases: Introduction, Growth, Maturity, and Decline. These 
phases are defined by the behaviour of revenues, which are expected to grow during the 
first two phases, to stabilize in the third, and to decline in the last one, when products 
usually exit the market. However, the lengths of each phase and of the whole life cycle 
do not have to be the same for all products. As Cox (1967) remarked, the length of the 
product life cycle depends on the “other products in the firm and the products of 
competing firms”. 
Regardless of the recognition of the importance of competing products on the 
shape of the life cycle of a product, the theory does not provide a fully integrated 
framework for this relationship. In fact, there is a lack of theoretical papers about 
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product survival4. In order to overthrow it, our strategy is to integrate several distinct 
theories, controlling for several variables that could have some impact on product 
survival, in order to test empirically our central hypothesis.  
One of the perspectives is that a firm’s number and type of products could 
extend or reduce the product survival. The total number of products of the firm has a 
positive impact on product profitability (and survival) if the products share costs within 
the firm, and, therefore, the larger the number of products the smaller the part of the 
cost to each product. These are scale effects, which are a competitive advantage when 
facing products from firms with a less extended portfolio (Stigler, 1968). 
Despite the positive effect expected from the total number of products, the 
number of existing and new close products in the firm may have a negative impact on 
product survival. First, new products could replace old ones, for the same firm, as 
proposed by Schmalensee (1978). As products get close of the Decline phase, it is 
expected that firms introduce innovative products, accelerating the “death” of the older 
product (Levitt, 1965; Cox, 1967). Second, the existing products represent competitive 
pressure over each other. Both effects are intra-firm competition, usually called 
cannibalization.  
Not only is the number of products important to explain product survival, but 
also the type of products within the portfolio of the firm. Products are more profitable if 
they are able to exploit scope economies (Panzar et al., 1981). The existence of products 
with some similar characteristic within the firm benefits each product if they share any 
input with a sub-additive cost function. Common examples of such inputs are marketing 
or sales force. 
In addition to the impact that a firm’s portfolio may have on the survival of a 
product, Cox (1967) suggests that inter-firm competition by products of other firms is 
                                                
4
 “Although researchers have invested substantial effort in analyzing firm survival and turnover (...), there 
are far fewer studies of the determinants of product survival, despite the obvious role of products in firm 
profitability. Theoretical papers are especially scarce on this topic, and rarely consider both market forces 
and portfolio decisions simultaneously.” (Figueiredo et al., 2006) 
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also relevant. According with him, the larger the number of competitors the smaller is 
the profitability of the product, due to price decrease, the decrease of quantity sold, or 
both. Therefore, a negative effect on product survival is expected. In pharmaceutical 
markets, there is evidence that brand market shares and brands profitability decrease 
with generic introduction (Aronsson et al., 2001; Bergman et al., 2003; Brekke et al., 
2007). 
Despite competition, pioneer products may have a survival advantage. Pioneer 
products were monopolists until a competitor entered into the market. During the length 
of monopoly, the consumers experienced the product. After the introduction of a 
substitute, they would be reluctant to switch because of uncertainty of trial 
(Schmalensee, 1982). The higher is the cost of switching or brand loyalty, the higher is 
the pioneer advantage. Both Caves et al. (1991) and Frank et al. (1997) show evidence 
of brand loyalty in pharmaceutical markets. 
Following the literature, previously mentioned, we control for all those effects 
on branded drugs survival. However, our central hypothesis concerns the impact of the 
introduction of an alternative destination on brand survival.  
Cox (1967) analyzes the product life cycle of ethical drugs. He draws the 
different curve for each drug and classifies it within six types of product life cycles. He 
finds that the predominant curve has the form of fourth-degree polynomials, with two 
local maximums instead of one as usually presented by the product life cycle 
framework. His explanation for the second maximum is “the use of a promotional 
“hypo””. However, the exploitation of any new competitive advantage, as a price 
competitive advantage, can create this effect. The transformation of a branded drug into 
a generic drug enables a firm to set the price of reference, if under a reference price 
system, or to benefit from a larger public reimbursement. Both situations increase the 
incentives to turn a brand drug into a generic. This is the argument for our main 
hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis: With higher incentives to turn a branded drug into a generic, the typical 
duration of a branded product is expected to decrease. Therefore, the possibility of 
transforming a brand into a generic drug changes the patterns of exit, becoming it less 
31 
 
probable. We expect that less products exit the market, because they have an alternative 
destination.  
 
Product exit determinants were already tested, for other markets by Stavins 
(1995), Greeinstein et al. (1998), Asplund et al. (1999), Ruebeck (2005), Requena-
Silvente (2005), and Figueiredo et al. (2006), but not on the pharmaceutical market. As 
showed on section 1, their results are diverse. Within the pharmaceutical market, we 
have multi-product firms that are simultaneously present in several sub-markets. Each 
firm is able to sell several drugs, and several preparations for each drug. Each 
preparation faces the competition of similar chemical drugs in close sub-markets, but it 
also faces competition from other drugs that have similar therapeutic usage, even been 
chemically different. Firms have to choose, in each sub-market, at each period, which 
preparations remain and which are dropped out. The market is regulated, and regulation 
changes along the period. This is the context, in which we intend to test our hypothesis, 
and it is distinct from previous studies. It is the fact that we have multi-product 
competition and market regulation that makes this market so important to be tested.  
 
 
3. Data and non-parametric estimation 
 
 We use a random sample of branded drugs, extracted from the database of 
INFARMED5, which contains all pharmaceuticals licensed in Portugal until October 
2006. The observation unit is a drug preparation. For each observation, we have some 
characteristics that are constant over time, and we are able to construct some variables 
to describe changes in market and firms over time. Our database has 44190 preparations 
from which he obtained a random sample of 2315 preparations (representing 10% of the 
products that were introduced in the market as brands). We had to select this sample for 
computational reasons, but we check the robustness of our findings by running the same 
analysis for different random samples. The results did not differ significantly. We 
follow those preparations from January 1996 to October 2006 (130 months). Table 1 
shows some descriptive statistics.  
                                                
5
 INFARMED is the Portuguese public agency for pharmaceuticals.  
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From the 2315 brands, 486 left the market (corresponding to 21%) and 83 
(3.6%) became generics, during the period under study. The other 1746 preparations 
have right-censured durations. Notice that 816 preparations were already in the market 
before 1st January 1996. Those are left-censored observations.  
We may observe that the average age at exit of the market is 132.6 months. For 
branded drugs that had been transformed into generic, they were transformed at the 
average age of 67.7 months. Our sample has products launched since 1953 until 2006. 
Only 6.1% of the preparations are non-prescription drugs. All the transformed branded 
drugs are prescription drugs. The majority of the products were introduced in the market 
by the national process (8.9% were introduced by the European central process and 
32.4% by mutual recognizing). None of the drugs that received license approval through 
a centralized process was transformed into a generic, which is not surprising given that 
the oldest drug introduced by this process is only 132 months old.  
 
Table 1: Summary statistics 
 All Sample Transformed Exits 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Central Process=1 2315 0.089 0.284 83 0.000 0.000 486 0.063 0.244 
National Process=1 2315 0.587 0.492 83 0.855 0.353 486 0.736 0.440 
Mutual Recognition=1 2315 0.323 0.467 83 0.144 0.353 486 0.199 0.400 
Non-prescription Drug=1 2315 0.061 0.240 83 0.000 0.000 486 0.051 0.221 
Year of Entry 2315 1995.396 885.628 83 1998.711 4.652 486 1991.895 9.594 
Age at Transformation 83 67.662 55.242 83 67.662 55.242 0   
Age at Exit 486 132.578 111.084 0    486 132.578 111.084 
Therapeutic Class 1 =1 2315 0.129 0.335 83 0.216 0.414 486 0.174 0.380 
Therapeutic Class 2 =1 2315 0.164 0.370 83 0.156 0.365 486 0.096 0.295 
Therapeutic Class 3 =1 2315 0.167 0.373 83 0.313 0.466 486 0.170 0.376 
Therapeutic Class 4 =1 2315 0.032 0.177 83 0.012 0.109 486 0.016 0.127 
Therapeutic Class 5 =1 2315 0.034 0.181 83 0.012 0.109 486 0.045 0.208 
Therapeutic Class 6 =1 2315 0,059 0,236 83 0,180 0,387 486 0,059 0,237 
Therapeutic Class 7 =1 2315 0,022 0,148 83 0,024 0,154 486 0,012 0,110 
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Therapeutic Class 8 =1 2315 0,073 0,2602 83 0,012 0,109 486 0,076 0,265 
Therapeutic Class 9 =1 2315 0,087 0,282 83 0,072 0,260 486 0,179 0,383 
Therapeutic Class 10 =1 2315 0.019 0.139 83 0.000 0.000 486 0.026 0.161 
Therapeutic Class 11 =1 2315 0.028 0.167 83 0.000 0.000 486 0.008 0.090 
Therapeutic Class 12 =1 2315 0.077 0.267 83 0.000 0.000 486 0.049 0.216 
Therapeutic Class 13 =1 2315 0.037 0.190 83 0.000 0.000 486 0.028 0.167 
Therapeutic Class 14 =1 2315 0.005 0.074 83 0.000 0.000 486 0.002 0.045 
Therapeutic Class 15 =1 2315 0.016 0.125 83 0.000 0.000 486 0.014 0.119 
Therapeutic Class 16 =1 2315 0.037 0.190 83 0.000 0.000 486 0.030 0.173 
Therapeutic Class 17 =1 2315 0.007 0.087 83 0.000 0.000 486 0.008 0.090 
 
The products were categorized into one of 17 Therapeutic Classes, according to 
the classification used by INFARMED6. For products classified simultaneously in 
several Therapeutic Classes, the class chosen was the first on the list of therapeutic 
classes for that product, which is usually the most relevant one. We may observe that 
there were not transformations in classes 10 to 177. Each Therapeutic Class is divided in 
several sub-classes that we use to define therapeutic substitutes, in estimation 
procedures.  
On Figure 1, we observe the behavior of the average rate of exit and the average 
rate of transformation into generic8. During 1996 and 1997, there were no exits. Indeed, 
exit rate increased mainly after 2000. The possibility of transformation seems to do not 
diminish the average rate of exit. During 2004 and the beginnings of 2005 the average 
rate of transformation had its larger values, but it decreased to values near zero, after 
middle 2005.  
 
                                                
6
 INFARMED classifies drugs in 20 Therapeutic Classes (using the “Código da Classificação 
Farmacoterapêutica” - Code of Pharmacotherapeutic Classification). Classes 18 to 20 were excluded from 
database because they were very small and residual classes. Observations with no information about 
Therapeutic Class were excluded too. This classification is similar to the one used by The European 
Medicines Agency.  
7
 For the entire population, we observe that there were 7 branded drugs of class 10 transformed into 
generics. However, they were not captured by our sample. In classes 11, 12, 14 and 17 there was no 
transformation at all.  
8
 Average rate of exit is the proportion of exits on total products in the market, for each month; and 
average rate of transformation is the proportion of transformations on total products in the market, for 
each month.  
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Figure1: Average Rates 
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We begin our brand survival analysis by estimating the non-parametric survivor 
and hazard functions, for the complete sample. We treat exits and transformations into 
generics as “deaths”. Analysis time unit is the month.  
Figure 2: Survival function 
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From Figure 2, the hazard rate is relatively constant. Half of the brands survive 
at least 216 months (near 18 years), and 12.5% of the brands survive more than 639 
months (more than 53 years).  
 
 
4. Estimation and discussion  
 
Now we use regression analysis to test the hypothesis of section 3. 
First, we use the data from January 1996 to September 2003, in order to estimate 
a model with only one destination for branded drugs: market exit. We choose the 
proportional hazard model, using the semi-parametric approach (commonly referred as 
the “Cox’s model”).  
βλβλ XetXt )(),,( 0=  
Using this model, we could estimate the effect of the explanatory variables, X, 
on the hazard rate, ),,( βλ Xt , without having to make any assumptions about the shape 
of the baseline hazard function, )(0 tλ . Under this specification, the Hazard Ratio is: 
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This is very appellative, in the sense that if we have two observations (i and j) 
that are identical but on the value of variable x, then: 
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The interpretation is that the hazard rate of i is )( jix xxe −β  of the hazard rate of j. 
Therefore, we have a measure of the impact of variable x on the hazard rate. This may 
be applied to all explanatory variables. 
We have some observations that are left-censured. They were already in the 
market on the 1 January 1996, time of the beginning of the analysis. Therefore, for 
those observations we don’t observe the complete survival spell, but this is accounted 
for in the estimation procedure. 
Cox’s model is appropriate for estimation of continuous time models. That is not 
the case of our data. Although survival times are measured in days, we group data by 
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month, in order to be computationally feasible to work with the panel. However, as our 
spell lengths are usually several years and there is a relatively low prevalence of ties, it 
is expected that Cox’s model provide acceptable estimation’s results. In order to 
account for the discreteness of data, we also use a discrete time proportional hazard 
model (the complementary log-log model). The dependent variable is a binary variable 
that is equal to one if the product exits the market in that month, and zero otherwise. 
Besides the independent variables used in Cox’s model, we also include binary 
variables9 for spell lengths. Using the exponential form of the results, we get hazard 
rates that could be interpreted in the same way as the results of Cox’s model. 
In a second step, we use data from October 2003 to October 2006, having two 
competing destinations for branded drugs: exit or transformation into generic. The 
hazard rate is now the sum of the destination-specific hazard rates: 
)()()( ttt tiontransformaexit λλλ += . 
We estimate this model using a multinomial logit framework. The use of the 
multinomial is adequate for discrete time models, as in our case, with competing events 
(Jenkins, 1995, 2004; Portugal et al., 2008)  
The interpretation of coefficients of multinomial logit is not as straightforward 
as that of the Cox’s model. In fact, having a model with two alternative destinations, 1 
for exit and 2 for transformation, and a 0 alternative (to continue in the market as a 
brand), we have: 
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where βm is the vector of coefficients associated with the mth alternative and 
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 is the odds ratio, or the relative probability of prefer m instead of 0. The 
interpretation of βm is given by: 
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This result extends to a more generic one: 
                                                
9
 Then, we don’t have to make any assumptions about baseline hazard. (Jenkins, 2004)  
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The coefficient βm (or βm-βk, in the generic case) measures the impact of a 
variable on the log odds ratio. Using this, we are able to see if the variable has a positive 
or negative effect on relative probabilities. 
The database was organized has an unbalanced panel. We cluster observations 
by product, because we expect that observations are independent across products but not 
within the lifetime of each product.   
 
 4.1. Before October 2003 
We start by estimating the regression for the period between January 1996 and 
September 2003. During that period, transformation into generic is not possible, and all 
the “deaths” are exits from the market. 
The independent variables contain characteristics of products, firms and of the 
market, measured on a monthly basis. The market is characterized by the total number 
of products and by binary variables that mark the type of regulation in each period. The 
number of products, the percentage of generic drugs within firm’s portfolio, and a 
binary variable, equal to one if the firm launched new products for the same therapeutic 
class of the product in that month, characterize firms. Product characteristics are a 
binary variable that says whether it is a non-pioneer drug, another if it is a non-
prescription drug, the type of marketing authorization (national, central or mutual 
recognition procedure) and year of entry; the age of the product; and binary variables 
for each therapeutic class10. For each product-month observation, we also use variables 
to characterize the internal and external competition that the product faces: we divided 
the market for each product in two levels: first, we have a sub-market that aggregates 
products that are chemically identical11; and, second, there is a sub-market that 
aggregates products in the same therapeutic sub-class12, even if they are not chemically 
                                                
10
 There are 17 therapeutic classes. On this first set of regressions, we exclude two binary variables, 
representing two therapeutic classes (10 and 14), from estimations, due to the lack of variability.  
11
 Those products have the same active substance, the same pharmaceutical form, and the same dosage.   
12
 Those products are in the same therapeutic sub-class (they have the same classification, according to 
the Code of Pharmacotherapeutic Classification).  
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identical. For each sub-market level, we have variables for the number of competitors 
and the number of own products.   
 In Table 2, we present the results of estimation using the Cox’s model and the 
complementary log-log (cloglog) model. The results are similar13.  
The number of products of the firm in the sub-market of therapeutic substitutes 
is significant for all the regressions, increasing the hazard rate. Those results are 
consistent with several empirical studies reviewed (Ruebeck, 2005; Requena-Silvente, 
2005; Greeinstein et al., 1998). By the contrary, the number of products of the firm in 
the sub-market of chemical substitutes is significant for all the regressions, and it has a 
positive impact on survival probability. Usually, the range of own products at the same 
sub-market of chemical substitutes is not of self-competitors but different packages of 
exactly the same product. Therefore, it is expected that firms take advantage from scope 
economies of those portfolios. 
Now, let us look to the effect of firm characteristics on exit. A higher proportion 
of generics in the portfolio of the firm increased brand’s probability of exit, but it lose 
significance when we account for regulation binary variables. According to the results, 
it seems that firms do some sort of specialization, opting for portfolios of generics or 
portfolios of brands. Products from larger firms (measured by the number of products) 
have a smaller hazard rate. Therefore, scale effects seem important for branded drugs 
survival; especially if these scale effects are not only achieved on production but also on 
marketing and distribution phases.   
The number of close competitors decreases the probability of exit. The number 
of competitors, at sub-market of chemical substitutes, is significant but it has an effect 
opposite to what was expected. A drug with one more competitor has an hazard rate 
0.962 times the hazard rate without that extra competitor. One possible explanation is 
that markets with higher number of competing products are more profitable markets 
and, therefore, even with competition, products tend to last longer in those markets. The 
number of therapeutic competitors and the number of total products in the market are 
not statistical significant.  
                                                
13
 In Appendix, we show the same estimations with an additional variable: Product is under Decree 
1278/2001. This variable is a binary variable that assumes the value one for products that are included in 
a list of products that have to accomplish new packaging rules, between December 2001 and November 
2002. It was expected that the inclusion on the list would increase the probability of exit. However, the 
results are only conclusive on the second formulation, but contrary to what was expected.   
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The improvement of generic competition due to regulatory changes had a 
negative effect over branded drug survival. Binary variables measure the effect of 
regulatory changes. The first indicates the period between the increase of public 
reimbursement for generic and the introduction of reference price system. During that 
period, between September 2000 and November 2002, the expected hazard rate was 
more than four times the hazard rate during the period before September 2000, and 
more than two times the hazard rate during the period after December 2002, everything 
else being constant. The introduction of reference pricing (in December 2002, 
accounted by the second binary variable) seems to not increase the probability of 
brand’s exit. The evidence that, during this period, no product under reference pricing 
exited the market reinforces this. This a surprising result, because we were expecting 
that stronger competition due to reference price system would make branded drugs 
survival harder. 
One interesting result is that non-prescription drugs, that are much less regulated 
and whose demand is decided by patients (not doctors), have a hazard rate 
approximately of 60% the hazard rate of prescription drugs. This suggests that branded 
drugs within a less regulated market have a higher probability of surviving. 
It was expected that pioneer products have a survival advantage, according with 
the brand loyalty argument. However, evidence does not show that.  The variable “Non-
pioneer Drug=1” is not significant to explain the hazard rate.   
      
Table 2: Estimations for the period January 1996 – September 2003 
 (i) (ii) 
 Cox Cloglog Cox Cloglog 
Year of Entry   0.723 0.719 
   (1.44) (1.47) 
Non-pioneer Drug=1 1.198 1.214 1.191 1.208 
 (1.09) (1.09) (1.04) (1.13) 
No. Products (all market) 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000** 1.000** 
 (11.65) (11.96) (2.42) (2.51) 
No. Products (own firm) 0.997*** 0.997*** 0.996*** 0.996*** 
 (6.34) (6.49) (6.30) (6.46) 
Proportion of generics (own firm) 2.301* 2.318* 2.209 2.227 
 (1.69) (1.10) (1.61) (1.62) 
No. Products (other firms, chemical substitutes) 0.963*** 0.962*** 0.962*** 0.961*** 
 (4.24) (4.30) (4.25) (4.31) 
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No. Products (own firm, chemical substitutes) 0.985** 0.859** 0.983** 0.983** 
 (1.98) (1.92) (2.11) (2.07) 
No. Products (own firm, therapeutic substitutes) 1.011*** 1.013*** 1.011*** 1.012*** 
 (5.19) (5.53) (4.91) (5.27) 
No. Products (other firms, therapeutic substitutes) 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
 (0.07) (0.02) (0.20) (0.13) 
If firm launched products=1 (in the same therapeutic class) 1.261 1.308 1.283 1.332 
 (1.23) (1.43) (1.31) (1.52) 
Between Sept. 2000 and Nov. 2002 = 1   4.402*** 4.304*** 
   (3.88) (3.82) 
Between Dec. 2002 and Sept. 2003 = 1   2.021 1.933 
   (1.30) (1.23) 
Non-prescription drug = 1 0.593* 0.583* 0.595* 0.585* 
 (1.78) (1.83) (1.76) (1.81) 
Central Process = 1 0.587 0.581 0.564 0.559 
 (1.10) (1.12) (1.19) (1.20) 
National Process =1  4.162*** 4.460*** 3.697*** 3.959*** 
 (5.48) (5.70) (5.04) (5.26) 
Therapeutic Class 1 =1 8.457** 8.582** 8.253** 8.351** 
 (2.10) (2.11) (2.08) (2.09) 
Therapeutic Class 2 =1 6.518* 6.540* 6.291* 6.333* 
 (1.84) (1.84) (1.80) (1.81) 
Therapeutic Class 3 =1 14.203*** 14.511*** 13.806*** 14.153*** 
 (2.62) (2.64) (2.59) (2.61) 
Therapeutic Class 4 =1 5.005 5.072 4.754 4.836 
 (1.48) (1.50) (1.44) (1.45) 
Therapeutic Class 5 =1 9.082** 9.163** 9.148** 9.271** 
 (2.10) (2.11) (2.11) (2.12) 
Therapeutic Class 6 =1 14.401** 14.780*** 13.836** 14.310*** 
 (2.59) (2.61) (2.55) (2.58) 
Therapeutic Class 7 =1 3.242 3.274 3.189 3.222 
 (0.96) (0.97) (0.95) (0.95) 
Therapeutic Class 8 =1 12.644** 12.917** 11.856** 12.148** 
 (2.43) (2.45) (2.37) (2.40) 
Therapeutic Class 9 =1 14.027*** 14.407*** 13.227** 13.591*** 
 (2.59) (2.62) (2.54) (2.56) 
Therapeutic Class 11 =1 5.365 5.800 5.126 5.560 
 (1.43) (1.50) (1.39) (1.47) 
Therapeutic Class 12 =1 7.367* 7.420* 7.113* 7.175* 
 (1.80) (1.81) (1.77) (1.78) 
Therapeutic Class 13 =1 3.230 3.235 3.131 3.142 
 (1.08) (1.08) (1.05) (1.05) 
Therapeutic Class 15 =1 13.007** 13.215** 12.636** 12.832** 
 (2.39) (2.40) (2.36) (2.37) 
Therapeutic Class 16 =1 13.476** 13.453** 12.503** 12.494** 
 (2.48) (2.48) (2.41) (2.41) 
Log-Likelihood -1203.475 -1277.571 -1174.069 -1247.913 
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Notes: Dependent variable is one if the product exits the market, and zero otherwise. The complementary log-log regressions also 
include a set of age binary variables that are not presented on the table. The results are expressed in hazard ratios. Robust z statistics 
are in parentheses. Observations are 122066. 
*Significantly different from zero at the 10% level. ** Significantly different from zero at the 5% level. *** Significantly different 
from zero at the 1% level. 
 
 From the results for the period before October 2003, we conclude that we have 
no evidence that inter-firm competition was a driving force of branded drugs’ exit. 
However, we found evidence that intra-firm competition, in the same therapeutic class, 
was relevant to explain exit. This may mean that firms are aware of the necessity to 
innovate, in order to keep profitability. If so, the product turnover is ensured, and 
consumers have access to innovative drugs. The consequence is that expenses with 
drugs would probably grow up, as more innovative drugs are likely to be higher-priced.   
 
4.2. Since October 2003 
Since October 2003, “deaths” are of two kinds: exits or transformations into 
generics. The base category is the maintenance in the market, as a brand. We estimate a 
multinomial logit, in order to include these two competing alternatives. Table 3 shows 
the results14.  
Internal competition is important to explain “death”, either though exit or 
transformation. Launches of new products increase the probability of “death” for firm’s 
own brands. If a firm launches a new drug, the relative probability of transformation 
increases, both related with the probability of stay in the market (the log odds ratio 
increases 0.845) or with the probability of exit (the log odds ratio increases 1.126). The 
number of own products in the same therapeutic sub-class has a positive and significant 
effect on the relative probability of exit, as before, but a negative and significant effect 
on the relative probability of transformation. The number of own products that are 
chemical substitutes is only significant to explain transformation with a positive signal, 
in the last two regressions. 
The dimension of the firm, measured by the number of products, decreases the 
relative probability of exit (the log odds ratio decreases 0,002), but has no effect over 
                                                
14
 As previously, in Appendix, we show the same estimations with an additional variable: Product is 
under Decree 1471/2004. That is a binary variable that assume the value one for products that are 
included in a list of products that have to accomplish new packages’ rules, after 2004. It was expected 
that the inclusion on the lists would increase the probability of exit. Unexpected, Product is under Decree 
1471/2004 has a negative effect on exit, despite not significant, and a positive effect on transformation.  
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transformation. Therefore, scale effects seem to be important, but only to explain exit. 
The proportion of generics has a positive effect on the relative probability of 
transformation and on the relative probability of exit. When comparing both 
probabilities (of exit and transformation), the proportion of generics increases the 
probability of transformation relatively to exit (the log odds ratio increases 2,001). 
Therefore, it seems that firms can exploit some kind of scope economies from the 
specialization of its portfolios, focusing on brand or generic products.     
The number of chemical competitors is significant both for exit and for 
transformation, but with a different signal. This variable has a negative effect on the 
relative probability of exit, but a positive effect on the relative probability of 
transformation. The number of therapeutic competitors is not significant for exit neither 
for transformation. The number of total products in the market has no impact over the 
probability of exit or transformation. As before, the only competition that matters is 
competition from chemical substitutes.     
Pioneer brands have a survival advantage. The relative probability of pioneer 
brands to exit the market or to be transformed is lower, as expected. Also, it is more 
probable that non-pioneer drugs are transformed than dropped out, compared with 
pioneer drugs (the log odds ratio increases 0.09).  
 
Table 3: Estimations for the period October 2003 – October 2006 
 Exit Transformation 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Age 0.010*** 0.002** -0.075* -0.071* 
 (4.79) (2.37) (-1.85) (-1.80) 
Age2 -0.000***  0.000  
 (-3.96)  (0.76)  
Year of Entry -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.703 -0.689 
 (-3.07) (-2.99) (-1.51) (1.50) 
Reference Price = 1 -2.689*** -2.575*** 1.820*** 1.816*** 
 (-2.74) (-2.62) (5.39) (5.37) 
No. Products (all market) 0.000** 0.000** 0.000 0.000 
 (-2.35) (-1.98) (0.46) (0.43) 
No. Products (own firm) 
-0.002*** -0.002*** 0.000 0.000 
 (-4.23) (-4.03) (0.12) (0.05) 
Proportion of generics (own firm) 0.935*** 0.895*** 2.936*** 2.931*** 
 (2.70) (2.58) (6.91) (6.89) 
No. Products (other firms, chemical substitutes) 
-0.005* -0.004 0.011*** 0.011*** 
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 (-1.87) (-1.57) (3.53) (3.52) 
No. Products (own firm, chemical substitutes) 
-0.002 -0.003 0.052*** 0.053*** 
 (-0.74) (-1.03) (2.67) (2.69) 
No. Products (own firm, therapeutic substitutes) 0.005* 0.005* -0.024*** -0.024*** 
 (1.91) (1.91) (-2.60) (-2.61) 
No. Products (other firms, therapeutic substitutes) 0.001** 0.000** 0.001 0.001 
 (2.35) (2.13) (1.43) (1.44) 
Non-pioneer Drug=1 0.637*** 0.576*** 0.727* 0.733* 
 (4.10) (3.72) (1.68) (1.69) 
If firm launched products=1 (in the same therapeutic class) 
-0.281 -0.305 0.845*** 0.847*** 
 (-1.32) (-1.44) (3.12) (3.11) 
Non-prescription drug = 1 
-0.425 -0.506 -45.976 -45.941 
 (-1.28) (-1.52) (.) (.) 
Central Process = 1 0.034 0.011 -43.624 -43.645 
 (0.11) (0.04) (.) (.) 
National Process =1  
-0.053 0.103 0.980** 0.971** 
 (-0.27) (0.55) (2.30) (2.29) 
Therapeutic Class 1 =1 
-0.288 -0.240 1397.945 1370.063 
 (-0.56) (-0.45) (1.51) (1.50) 
Therapeutic Class 2 =1 
-1.539*** -1.560*** 1398.005 1370.149 
 (-2.79) (-2.70) (1.51) (1.50) 
Therapeutic Class 3 =1 
-1.074** -0.995* 1397.246 1369.454 
 (-1.96) (-1.74) (1.51) (1.49) 
Therapeutic Class 4 =1 
-2.072** -1.979** 1397.286 1369.454 
 (-2.40) (-2.24) (1.51) (1.49) 
Therapeutic Class 5 =1 
-0.186 -0.177 1398.557 1370.691 
 (-0.34) (-0.31) (1.51) (1.50) 
Therapeutic Class 6 =1 
-0.775 0.751 1397.445 1369.563 
 (-1.36) (-1.27) (1.51) (1.50) 
Therapeutic Class 7 =1 
-0.805 -0.778 1398.590 1370.715 
 (-1.16) (-1.10) (1.51) (1.50) 
Therapeutic Class 8 =1 
-0.546 -0.448 1397.651 1369.751 
 (-0.98) (-0.78) (1.51) (1.50) 
Therapeutic Class 9 =1 0.291 0.358 1398.390 1370.513 
 (0.57) (0.67) (1.51) (1.50) 
Therapeutic Class 10 =1 0.437 0.442 1,354.225 1326.359 
 (0.78) (0.75) (.) (.) 
Therapeutic Class 11 =1 
-1.999* -1.979* 1353.565 1325.694 
 (-1.78) (-1.74) (.) (.) 
Therapeutic Class 12 =1 
-0.135 -0.012 1345.258 1317.266 
 (-0.24) (-0.02) (.) (.) 
Therapeutic Class 13 =1 
-0.734 -0.676 1354.618 1326.760 
 (-1.22) (-1.08) (.) (.) 
Therapeutic Class 14 =1 
-1.560 -1.328 1356.447 1328.566 
 (-1.54) (-1.28) (.) (.) 
Therapeutic Class 15 =1 
-46.171 -46.016 1355.882 1328.006 
 
(.) (.) (.) (.) 
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Therapeutic Class 16 =1 
-1.601** -1.536** 1353.876 1325.980 
 (2.11) (-2.00) (.) (.) 
Pseudo R2 0.9737 0.9735  
 
Notes: Dependent variable is two if the branded drug is transformed into generic, is one if the product exits the market, and zero 
otherwise. Robust z statistics are in parentheses. Observations are 66017. 
*Significantly different from zero at the 10% level. ** Significantly different from zero at the 5% level. *** Significantly different 
from zero at the 1% level. 
 
Inter-firm competition has little impact on branded drug’s “deaths”.  One 
possible explanation is that the number of competitors is not the relevant variable to 
explain survival, and others variables, as prices or market shares if available, should 
capture better the effect of inter-firm competition. As before, the intra-firm competition 
effect, the firm’s portfolio and its size are important to explain exit. However, the effect 
over transformation is more misdealing: we observe a intra-firm competition effect with 
chemical substitutes, but the opposite with therapeutic substitutes, and scale effects 
seem not significant.  
 
4.3. From 1996 to 2006: testing the effect of transformation on exit  
Now, we can test our central hypothesis: the possibility of transforming a brand 
into generic changes exit patterns. In order to do that, we get back to our first 
estimations with one single destination: exit from market, but now we estimate it for the 
all period. We treat the transformed products as no censured observations, meaning that 
we ignore the transformation as an end for the product. We included a binary variable 
that indicates the period since October 2003, in estimations.  
 
Table 4: Estimations for the period January 1996 – October 2006 
 Cox Cloglog 
Since Oct. 2003=1 3.731** 7.388*** 
 (2.37) (3.91) 
Year of Entry 0.699** 0.666** 
 (2.06) (2.59) 
Non-pioneer Drug=1 1.327** 1.367*** 
 (2.34) (2.86) 
No. Products (all market) 1.000* 1.000** 
 (1.91) (2.38) 
No. Products (own firm) 0.998*** 0.998*** 
 (5.15) (8.24) 
Proportion of generics (own firm) 2.234*** 2.586*** 
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 (3.24) (3.58) 
No. Products (other firms, chemical substitutes) 0.990*** 0.988*** 
 (3.53) (4.59) 
No. Products (own firm, chemical substitutes)  0.998 0.998 
 (0.45) (0.68) 
No. Products (own firm, therapeutic substitutes) 1.005*** 1.007*** 
 (3.52) (4.72) 
No. Products (other firms, therapeutic substitutes) 1.000* 1.000** 
 (1.90) (2.08) 
If firm launched products=1 (in the same therapeutic class) 0.993 1.011 
 (0.05) (0.08) 
Between Sept. 2000 and Nov. 2002 = 1 4.628*** 9.054*** 
 (4.61) (7.16) 
Between Dec. 2002 and Sept. 2003 = 1 2.929** 5.604*** 
 (2.33) (4.11) 
Non-prescription drug = 1 0.706 0.648** 
 (1.51) (1.98) 
Central Process = 1 0.897 0.863 
 (0.27) (0.65) 
National Process =1  1.639** 1.712*** 
 (2.27) (3.56) 
Therapeutic Class 1 =1 0.973 1.011 
 (0.05) (0.02) 
Therapeutic Class 2 =1 0.555 0.515 
 (1.09) (1.26) 
Therapeutic Class 3 =1 0.903 0.936 
 (0.19) (0.13) 
Therapeutic Class 4 =1 0.439 0.376 
 (1.24) (1.59) 
Therapeutic Class 5 =1 1.204 1.296 
 (0.34) (0.47) 
Therapeutic Class 6 =1 1.003 1.078 
 (0.01) (0.14) 
Therapeutic Class 7 =1 0.603 0.566 
 (0.73) (0.88) 
Therapeutic Class 8 =1 1.052 1.091 
 (0.09) (0.16) 
Therapeutic Class 9 =1 1.755 1.820 
 (1.10) (1.16) 
Therapeutic Class 10 =1 1.446 1.577 
 (0.61) (0.79) 
Therapeutic Class 11 =1 0.506 0.422 
 (0.83) (1.21) 
Therapeutic Class 12 =1 0.942 1.095 
 (0.10) (0.16) 
Therapeutic Class 13 =1 0.570 0.506 
 (0.97) (1.19) 
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Therapeutic Class 14 =1 0,310 0,194 
 (1.12) (1.47) 
Therapeutic Class 15 =1 0.818 0.809 
 (0.30) (0.34) 
Therapeutic Class 16 =1 0.754 0.770 
 (0.45) (0.46) 
Log-Likelihood -2391.761 -2723.188 
Notes: Dependent variable is one if the product exits the market, and zero otherwise. The complementary log-log regressions also 
include a set of age binary variables that are not presented on the table. The results are expressed in hazard ratios. Robust z statistics 
are in parentheses. Observations are 187832. 
*Significantly different from zero at the 10% level. ** Significantly different from zero at the 5% level. *** Significantly different 
from zero at the 1% level. 
 
The variable “Since October 2003 = 1” is significant and has a positive effect on 
exit. However, the probability of exit does not increase after October 2003, when 
compared with every other period. Comparing with the immediately previous period 
(between December 2002 and September 2003), the hazard of exit since October 2003 
is more or less 1.3 times the previous hazard of exit. However, comparing with the 
period between September 2000 and November 2002, the hazard of exit since October 
2003 is smaller (near 0.8 times the first). Therefore, we conclude that the introduction of 
a major public reimbursement for generics had a large impact on branded drugs exit. 
That impact was reduced, after the introduction of the reference price system, and it was 
recovered with the possibility of transformation of branded drugs on generics.  
Even with the possibility of transformation, the relative probability of exit is not 
reduced which seems to contradict our hypothesis that drugs, that would exit other way, 
now will be transformed. However, it is possible that, after October 2003, the 
transformation of competing products (internal or external to the firm) increased the 
probability of branded drug’s exit, just because there are more generics in the market 
and a complete regulatory framework that stimulates brand-generic competition. Notice 
that the regulatory measures were cumulative, and since October 2003 all three are 
effective simultaneously.  
 
 
5. Conclusions 
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This paper analyzes branded drugs survival, assuming that brands may disappear 
either by exiting the market or by being transformed into generics, extending the initial 
life cycle.  
We show that different regulatory measures, such as prices, co-payments, and 
selling rules, have an impact on the substitution of older products for more innovative 
ones, and more expensive drugs for cheaper ones, when they are taken. Of the factors 
that influence the “death” of branded drugs, we verify that, more than competing 
products, it is the type and number of products of the same firm that have an important 
effect on “death” rates. We also observe that the variables that explain exit are different 
from those that explain transformation. Branded drugs were transformed into generics 
on a different age compared with the decision to completely exit the market. 
Despite the possibility of transformation, the average rate of exit did not 
diminish after 2003, by the contrary. We observe that with the complete regulatory 
framework (taken as that achieved on October 2003) branded drugs have less 
probability of surviving. This suggests that only regulatory measures fully integrated are 
able to incentive competition and product turnover. The difference on survival patterns 
of non-prescription drugs, compared with prescription drugs, help to bear that 
conclusion.  
 The main caveat of this work is the lack of data on prices and market shares. 
With that kind of data we would be able to include a hedonic price approach, similar to 
what was done by Stavins (1995), Ruebeck (2005), or Figueiredo et al. (2006). The 
hedonic price approach, more than a mere comparison of prices, would enable us to 
measure if the product is under or over-priced. It would allow us to draw more accurate 
conclusions about competition and product turnover, namely if survival was explained 
also by quality or cost differentiation. That should be the approach for future work.      
 
 
Appendix 
 
Table 2-A: Estimations for the period January 1996 – September 2003  
(With the Decree 1278/2001 effect) 
 (i) (ii) 
 Cox Cloglog Cox Cloglog 
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Year of Entry   0.726 0.721 
   (1.42) (1.45) 
Non-pioneer Drug=1 1.198 1.214 1.184 1.198 
 (1.09) (1.17) (1.01) (1.08) 
No. Products (all market) 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 
 (11.65) (11.85) (2.86) (2.94) 
No. Products (own firm) 0.997*** 0.997*** 0.997*** 0.997*** 
 (6.34) (6.49) (6.34) (6.48) 
Proportion of generics (own firm) 2.297* 2.316* 2.154 2.168 
 (1.68) (1.70) (1.57) (1.57) 
No. Products (other firms, chemical substitutes) 0.963*** 0.962*** 0.963*** 0.962*** 
 (4.23) (4.29) (4.24) (4.30) 
No. Products (own firm, chemical substitutes) 0.985** 0.985** 0.984** 0.984** 
 (1.97) (1.92) (2.08) (2.05) 
No. Products (own firm, therapeutic substitutes) 1.011*** 1.013*** 1.012*** 1.012*** 
 (5.19) (5.54) (5.03) (5.33) 
No. Products (other firms, therapeutic substitutes) 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
 (0.09) (0.03) (0.46) (0.39) 
If firm launched products=1 (in the same therapeutic class) 1.263 1.309 1.307 1.350 
 (1.23) (1.43) (1.41) (1.59) 
Product is under Decree 1278/2001 0.942 0.971 0.532*** 0.544*** 
 (0.29) (0.14) (2.07) (2.63) 
Between Sept. 2000 and Nov. 2002 = 1   3.473*** 3.423*** 
   (3.30) (3.26) 
Between Dec. 2002 and Sept. 2003 = 1   1.137 1.107 
   (0.23) (0.18) 
Nonprescription drug = 1 0.592* 0.583* 0.592* 0.582* 
 (1.78) (1.83) (1.77) (1.83) 
Central Process = 1 0.587 0.581 0.553 0.549 
 (1.10) (1.12) (1.23) (1.23) 
National Process =1  4.183*** 4.470*** 3.813*** 4.058*** 
 (5.49) (5.70) (5.13) (5.33) 
Therapeutic Class 1 =1 8.553** 8.632** 9.580** 9.703** 
 (2.11) (2.12) (2.22) (2.23) 
Therapeutic Class 2 =1 6.548* 6.555* 6.601* 6.648* 
 (1.84) (1.84) (1.80) (1.86) 
Therapeutic Class 3 =1 14.401*** 14.612*** 16.558*** 16.942*** 
 (2.11) (2.64) (2.76) (2.78) 
Therapeutic Class 4 =1 5.005 5.072 4.700 4.777 
 (1.48) (1.50) (1.43) (1.44) 
Therapeutic Class 5 =1 9.082** 9.164** 9.133** 9.274** 
 (2.10) (2.11) (2.10) (2.12) 
Therapeutic Class 6 =1 14.410** 14.805*** 13.900** 14.407*** 
 (2.59) (2.61) (2.55) (2.59) 
Therapeutic Class 7 =1 3.246 3.275 3.237 3.268 
 (0.96) (0.97) (0.96) (0.97) 
Therapeutic Class 8 =1 12.653** 12.921** 11.777** 12.609** 
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 (2.43) (2.45) (2.37) (2.39) 
Therapeutic Class 9 =1 14.219*** 14.506*** 15.627*** 16.033*** 
 (2.61) (2.63) (2.70) (2.72) 
Therapeutic Class 11 =1 5.374 5.804 5.139 5.569 
 (1.43) (1.50) (1.39) (1.47) 
Therapeutic Class 12 =1 7.353* 7.416* 7.003* 7.105* 
 (1.80) (1.81) (1.76) (1.77) 
Therapeutic Class 13 =1 3.232 3.236 3.130 3.143 
 (1.08) (1.08) (1.05) (1.05) 
Therapeutic Class 15 =1 13.027** 13.225** 12.750** 12.955** 
 (2.39) (2.40) (2.37) (2.38) 
Therapeutic Class 16 =1 13.472** 13.452** 12.423** 12.443** 
 (2.48) (2.48) (2.40) (2.40) 
 
Log-Likelihood 
 
-1203.434 -1277.561 -1170.221 -1244.289 
Notes: Dependent variable is one if the product exits the market, and zero otherwise. The complementary log-log regressions also 
include a set of age binary variables that are not presented on the table. The results are expressed in hazard ratios. Robust z statistics 
are in parentheses. Observations are 122066. 
*Significantly different from zero at the 10% level. ** Significantly different from zero at the 5% level. *** Significantly different 
from zero at the 1% level. 
 
 
Table 3-A: Estimations for the period October 2003 – October 2006 
(With the Decree 1471/2004 effect) 
 Exit Transformation 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Age 0.010*** 0.002** -0.082** -0.078** 
 (4.78) (2.29) (-2.02) (-1.97) 
Age2 -0.000***  0.000  
 (-3.97)  (0.81)  
Year of Entry -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.788* -0.773* 
 (-3.14) (-3.06) (-1.69) (1.68) 
Reference Price = 1 -2.689*** -2.572*** 1.836*** 1.829*** 
 (-2.73) (-2.61) (5.38) (5.37) 
No. Products (all market) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (-0.84) (-0.62) (-0.34) (-0.37) 
No. Products (own firm) -0.002*** -0.002*** 0.000 0.000 
 (-4.24) (-4.03) (0.14) (0.07) 
Proportion of generics (own firm) 0.918*** 0.876** 2.927*** 2.923*** 
 (2.65) (2.52) (6.98) (6.96) 
No. Products (other firms, chemical substitutes) -0.005* -0.004 0.011*** 0.011*** 
 (-1.85) (-1.56) (3.55) (3.52) 
No. Products (own firm, chemical substitutes) -0.002 -0.003 0.051** 0.052*** 
 (-0.72) (-1.00) (2.55) (2.57) 
No. Products (own firm, therapeutic substitutes) 0.005* 0.005* -0.024** -0.024** 
 (1.91) (1.91) (-2.54) (-2.56) 
No. Products (other firms, therapeutic substitutes) 0.001** 0.000** 0.001 0.001 
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 (2.36) (2.14) (1.37) (1.38) 
Non-pioneer Drug=1 0.639*** 0.579*** 0.743* 0.752* 
 (4.11) (3.72) (1.70) (1.72) 
If firm launched products=1 (in the same therapeutic class) -0.274 -0.298 0.821*** 0.824** 
 (-1.28) (-1.41) (3.02) (3.02) 
Product is under Decree 1471/2004 -0.232 -0.219 1.198*** 1.193*** 
 (-1.07) (-1.01) (2.76) (2.75) 
Nonprescription drug = 1 -0.440 -0.522 -45.899 -45.864 
 (-1.32) (-1.56) (.) (.) 
Central Process = 1 0.046 0.022 -43.640 -43.664 
 (0.15) (0.07) (.) (.) 
National Process =1  -0.053 0.102 0.988** 0.981** 
 (-0.27) (0.55) (2.30) (2.29) 
Therapeutic Class 1 =1 -0.282 -0.235 1572.713* 1542.927* 
 (-0.55) (-0.44) (1.70) (1.68) 
Therapeutic Class 2 =1 -1.469*** -1.495*** 1572.653* 1542.893* 
 (-2.68) (-2.60) (1.70) (1.68) 
Therapeutic Class 3 =1 -0.961* -0.889 1571.713* 1541.947* 
 (-1.73) (-1.54) (1.70) (1.68) 
Therapeutic Class 4 =1 -1.972** -1.888** 1571.733* 1542.010* 
 (-2.27) (-2.12) (1.70) (1.68) 
Therapeutic Class 5 =1 -0.099 -0.097 1573.095* 1543.323* 
 (-0.18) (-0.17) (1.70) (1.68) 
Therapeutic Class 6 =1 -0.685 0.664 1571.853* 1542.068* 
 (-1.19) (-1.12) (1.70) (1.68) 
Therapeutic Class 7 =1 -0.717 -0.689 1572.938* 1543.160* 
 (-1.02) (-0.97) (1.70) (1.68) 
Therapeutic Class 8 =1 -0.435 -0.344 1571.996* 1542.238* 
 (-0.77) (-0.59) (1.70) (1.68) 
Therapeutic Class 9 =1 0.404 0.465 1572.800* 1543.024* 
 (0.78) (0.86) (1.70) (1.68) 
Therapeutic Class 10 =1 0.433 0.439 1529.191 1499.422 
 (0.76) (0.74) (.) (.) 
Therapeutic Class 11 =1 -2.007* -1.984* 1528.461 1498.692 
 (-1.78) (-1.74) (.) (.) 
Therapeutic Class 12 =1 -0.031 0.088 1519.800 1490.903 
 (-0.06) (-0.15) (.) (1.63) 
Therapeutic Class 13 =1 -0.611 -0.557 1529.011 1499.253 
 (-1.01) (-0.89) (.) (.) 
Therapeutic Class 14 =1 -1.558 -1.325 1530.325 1500.539 
 (-1.53) (-1.27) (.) (.) 
Therapeutic Class 15 =1 -46.136 -45.982 1530.612 1500.828 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) 
Therapeutic Class 16 =1 -1.491** -1.431* 1528.302 1498.501 
 (1.96) (-1.86) (.) (.) 
 
Pseudo R2 
 
 
0.9737 
 
0.9736 
  
51 
 
Notes: Dependent variable is two if the branded drug is transformed into generic, is one if the product exits the market, and zero 
otherwise. Robust z statistics are in parentheses. Observations are 66017. 
*Significantly different from zero at the 10% level. ** Significantly different from zero at the 5% level. *** Significantly different 
from zero at the 1% level.  
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Essay 3: Survival of Pharmaceutical Products: a 
Cross-countries Analysis  
 
1. Introduction  
 
The purpose of this work is to understand the determinants of survival of 
pharmaceutical products and how their effect varies across countries. Departing from 
differences and similarities between three countries, Portugal, New Zealand and 
Sweden, we intend to analyze the impact of different regulatory environments on 
product survival.  
Portugal, New Zealand and Sweden’s pharmaceutical markets are relative small 
pharmaceutical markets. Furthermore, their evolution has been very similar in the most 
recent years. In 2005, the total expenditures on pharmaceuticals in these three countries 
were far under OECD average. From 1997 to 2005, their real annual growth rates for 
pharmaceutical expenditures were between 3.9% and 4.1%. Public share of 
pharmaceutical expenditures, on the other hand, was above OECD average (OECD, 
2008). That explains the concern of national governments with the magnitude and the 
trend of pharmaceutical expenditures and the subsequent implementation of measures to 
control it.  
The three countries under study implemented, at some point between January 
1990 and October 2006 (the time length of our analysis), a reference price system for 
reimbursement of pharmaceuticals. The reference price systems are different between 
countries and they are complemented with other measures in order to increase 
competition or simply to reduce expenditures with pharmaceuticals. Therefore, we 
intend to test if reference price systems encourage competition, in our case decreasing 
the rate of survival of pharmaceutical products, or if differences in rates result from 
other complementing measures.   
There are several studies that perform international comparisons on 
pharmaceutical markets, but none of them focused on the determinants of the survival 
of pharmaceutical products. In fact, the entry of pharmaceutical products has been the 
purpose of most studies. However, product survival is particularly important to 
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understand competition, price evolution, profitability of drugs and the pressure that 
firms face to withdraw the less profitable ones. On the other hand, studies for other 
markets that not pharmaceutical markets were carried for a single country (Stavins, 
1995; Greeinstein et al., 1998; Asplund et al., 1999; Ruebeck, 2005; Requena-Silvente, 
2005; Figueiredo et al., 2006). In this paper, we innovate by presenting a cross-countries 
analysis of product survival.  
A survival model is developed, taking into consideration the characteristics of 
the national markets, such as regulation, dimension, degree of competition, and also 
firm and product characteristics. The survival model is applied both on separated 
estimations for each country, and on estimations using data of the three countries. 
We conclude that there is no evidence of intra-firm competition effects on 
pharmaceutical product survival, but inter-firm competition is relevant to explain it. We 
believe that the absence of evidence of intra-firm competition is the consequence of the 
prevalence of scale or scope economies over the dispute for scarce resources within 
firm’s portfolios. The introduction of a reference price system does not imply, de per se, 
an increase of the likelihood of pharmaceutical product exit. The results are as 
ambiguous as other results on the impact of reference price system on competition 
variables. Finally, there are country specificities that have an impact both on product 
survival and on the effect of other variables on product survival.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the 
pharmaceutical market environment within the three national markets under comparison 
and the theoretic background. Section 3 describes the data and shows non-parametric 
estimations. Section 4 has semi-parametric estimations and the discussion of results. In 
the last section, we draw our main conclusions.  
 
 
2. Background  
 
2.1 The pharmaceutical markets in Portugal, New Zealand and Sweden 
2.1.1 Portugal 
The Portuguese national health system ensures that all citizens have access to 
health care, for free or paying only small co-payments. For pharmaceutical products, the 
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public subsidization is low, forcing consumers to bear a significant share of the cost 
through out-of-pocket payments. On average, prescription drugs have a relative high 
weight compared with other countries, but the consumption of generics, despite being 
growing, is still relatively low. The pharmaceutical production is insipient with almost 
all products being imported. The number and dispersion of pharmacies is better than in 
many European countries, ensuring an easy access to pharmaceutical products 
(APIFARMA, 2002, 2008). Hospitals have a service for dispensing prescriptions to 
outpatients, but only for a limited set of pharmaceuticals, which carry no coinsurance 
(Barros et al., 2007). 
Several regulatory changes were introduced on the pharmaceutical market, in 
Portugal, since 1990. These changes aimed to rationalize the consumption of medicines 
because evidence showed that the consumption and, consequently, both public and 
private expenditure with medicines were relatively high when compared with other 
countries. Many of those measures intended to stimulate the use of generic drugs, which 
are usually cheaper. In September 2000, the Government increased the reimbursement 
rate of generic drugs by 10 percentage points (the cost of a generic drug is always 
supported by the State on more 10 percentage points than the branded drugs, reducing 
the cost with generic drugs born by patients).  
Another important measure was the introduction of the reference price system 
for some products in December 2002. The reference-price, which is the price of the 
most expensive generic preparation of that active substance, is only established if the 
product has, at least, one generic substitute. The scope of this price reference system is 
relatively narrow because it only compares the prices between chemical substitutes, 
ignoring therapeutic alternatives. 
The prices of pharmaceuticals are controlled through international comparison. 
Prescription is not subject to any budget restriction. INFARMED (the Portuguese public 
agency for medicines) centralizes both market authorization and subsidization 
processes. 
 
2.1.2. New Zealand 
Health care services, including pharmaceutical products, are supported mainly 
by taxes. In fact, patient co-payments for pharmaceutical were only introduced in 1985. 
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In international comparisons, New Zealand appears as one of the countries where prices 
of pharmaceuticals are lower (Danzon et al, 2005; OECD, 2008). However, that was not 
always the case: in the late 80s and early 90s, the evidence that New Zealand had high-
priced off patent drugs led to important reforms (Braae et al., 1999). 
In 1993, reference price system was implemented1 and PHARMAC 
(Pharmaceutical Management Agency Limited) was established. The reference price is 
the lowest price in each therapeutic subgroup, regardless of patent status or market 
share. The New Zealander system embraces more products within each comparative 
group than the Portuguese system, and consequently it should induce more competition. 
The reference price system acts as a de facto price control system, since high-priced 
drugs are not reimbursed. Additionally, PHARMAC only admits reimbursement for 
new products if they have a lower price than the reference, within the respective 
therapeutic subgroup (Danzon et al., 2004).  Doing so, PHARMAC maintains the price 
of pharmaceuticals low, holding down the public cost with pharmaceuticals (Miller, 
2006).  
In 1997, PHARMAC became in charge of defining a positive list of drugs that 
are eligible for reimbursement and of establishing subsidy levels. PHARMAC acts as a 
public monopoly purchaser. Having considerable bargaining power, PHARMAC 
controls pharmaceutical expenditure through agreements and contracts with 
pharmaceutical suppliers (French et al., 2001), namely by having introduced public 
tenders for sole subsidized supply, which guarantees a temporary monopoly for the 
winner of the tender. Incumbent firms are pressured to decrease prices, but entry of 
lower priced products is not possible during the temporary monopoly.   
The market authorization process (under responsibility of the Ministry of 
Health) is separated from the subsidization process (under responsibility of 
PHARMAC). There are examples of prescription and over-the-counter drugs that are 
commercialized without any subsidy (Braae et al., 1999). Contrary to Portugal and 
Sweden, New Zealand permits direct-to-consumer advertising of prescription drugs. 
The rational is that paying for higher-priced drugs should be a patient’s choice, and they 
must be informed in order to opt (Miller, 2006). 
  
                                                
1
 Before 1993, reference price was applied for some isolated cases, but not as a structured system of 
reimbursement.  
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2.1.3 Sweden 
Pharmaceutical expenditure per capita in Sweden is lower than the average of 
OECD countries. Moïse et al. (2007) suggest that relatively low pharmaceutical 
expenditures in Sweden are due to its low retail prices, rather than to low levels of 
consumption. In fact, the retail prices for pharmaceuticals are relatively low, in contrast 
to average prices received by manufacturers, which are high. That is due to low retail 
and wholesale’s margins and the inexistence of VAT for prescribed medicines (Moïse et 
al., 2007). 
The Swedish pharmacy market structure is a monopoly. The public monopolist, 
Apoteket, ensures the coverage of market but pharmacy density is low, limiting 
consumer convenience.  
There is no explicit regulation on pharmaceutical prices in Sweden. However, de 
facto regulation exists through the reimbursement system. In 1993, a reference price 
system for reimbursement was developed, which implied the creation of a positive list 
for reimbursement, the List of Substitutable Products (Andersson et al., 2007). The 
reference price is the lowest-price generic substitute. The chemical substitution is the 
reference (as in Portugal). However, therapeutic substitutes are accounted at the 
previous decision of including the products on the List of Substitutable Products. The 
rate of public subsidization differs with the level of consumption of the patient. There is 
a ceiling for patient co-payments, above which the drugs are fully subsidized.  The 
process for subsidization (responsibility of The Dental and Pharmaceutical Benefits 
Agency) is separated from the processes of market authorization and the decision on 
which drugs are exchangeable (responsibility of the Medical Products Agency) 
(Glenngård et al., 2005).  
The generic substitution policy, mandatory since October 2002, has enabled 
Sweden to achieve fairly high penetration of generic drugs into the market in terms of 
volume, with a considerably low share of the total value of the market. However, the 
use of the lowest-priced listed drug, as the reference for substitution, risks undermining 
the competitiveness of the generic drug industry, which is an important sector in 
Sweden (Moïse et al., 2007).  
 
2.2 Previous work 
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Pharmaceutical product survival should be treated within literature on portfolio 
location by multi-product firms. Pharmaceutical firms are usually multi-product firms 
and the decisions to launch a new product or to withdraw an existing one can be 
independent of the decision of entry or exit, respectively, of the firm itself. Additionally, 
pharmaceutical multi-product firms face different types of market structure on each of 
the distinct sub-markets where they are present, sometimes even with more than one 
product in each of those sub-markets. Therefore, all these aspects should be 
incorporated when studying pharmaceutical product survival.  
The literature on product survival within multi-product firms is not vast. Some 
previous empirical studies (Ruebeck, 2005; Requena-Silvente, 2005; Greeinstein et al., 
1998) show the existence of a positive relationship between sub-market intra-firm 
competition (also known as “cannibalization”) and the probability of product exit. Also, 
there is evidence that inter-firm competition is also important to explain exit. Other 
studies focus on the desegregation of firm effects and product effects. Firm specificities 
(which could signify scale or scope economies) may imply different survival spells for 
identical products (Stavins, 1995; Asplund et al., 1999; Figueiredo et al., 2006). 
However, what characteristics matter is not clear from all these works that have 
dissonant results.  
 For the pharmaceutical market, one work is available concerning product exit. 
Virabhac et al (2008) conclude, for the American market, that the impact of competition 
on branded drug exit is small, and the only competition that matters is that from generic 
substitutes. Their study ignores firm characteristics, using only product and market 
effects.  
 One caveat of those works is that they are single-country analysis. Therefore, 
differences in results could be explained by differences between the countries under 
study, among other reasons.  
Within the pharmaceutical market’s literature, the international comparative 
studies are common for studying: launch delay of innovative drugs, price levels, and 
regulatory systems. Some recent examples of cross-countries analysis are Danzon et al. 
(2004, 2005, 2008), Kyle (2006, 2007), and Lanjouw (2005). However, as for other 
industries, international comparison was not used to study product exit.  
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The reference price system is a reimbursement system where a reference price is 
established for a group of medicines. The public reimbursement for all products within 
the reference group is calculated using the reference price as basis. Reference price 
systems around the world vary in the definition of the group of reference and the price 
of reference, the rate of reimbursement, the range of patients covered by the system, the 
cumulative existence (or not) of other regulatory rules. The rational for the introduction 
of a reference price system is two-folders: first, to increase price-sensitivity of patients 
or doctors and achieve a more cost-efficient consumption of pharmaceuticals; second, to 
pass for patients the over-cost of more expensive drugs, alleviating the public budget. 
As a consequence of the increase of demand price-sensitivity, it is also expected that 
competition between products will increase, after the introduction of a reference price 
system. 
The panoply of descriptive studies describing and comparing reimbursement 
systems, usually focus on the reference price system. Mossialos et al (2005), comparing 
the regulatory systems of France, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, 
argue that does not exist such a unique policy or policy combination right for all 
countries, and different countries have to find the adequate policy approach to their own 
environment. Empirical papers on the impact of the reference price system are fewer 
and show inconclusive results. Cost savings, which are the main objective of the 
system, do not occur always, depending on other regulatory measures. Danzon et al. 
(2004) found that, in Germany, the Netherlands and New Zealand, the reference price 
system did not stimulate competition, lowering prices as expected. They confirm that 
other measures to control prices (and costs) were adopted because the reference price 
could not reach that objective.  
We broadly study the determinants of pharmaceutical product survival within 
Portugal, Sweden and New Zealand. We do a cross-country analysis of pharmaceutical 
product survival. We consider covariates that literature on product survival analysis 
applied to other industries had demonstrated to be relevant, controlling for country 
effects. Also, we build on the previous analysis by considering the reference price 
system and other country-specific regulatory changes.  
Additionally, we test two specific hypotheses. First, the idea that differences 
between countries have impact not only on the survival rates itself but also on the effect 
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of other variables on survival rates (Hypothesis 1). Therefore, such characteristics 
should be accounted when performing single-country analysis. Second, the isolate effect 
of reference price on product survival may be ambiguous, as it does not guarantee de 
per se a more competitive environment (Hypothesis 2).  
 
 
3. Data and non-parametric estimation 
 
 Our dataset includes 3543 products, marketed in Portugal (1612 products), 
Sweden (986 products) or New Zealand (945 products), between January 1990 and 
October 2006, representing a random sample of 25% of the complete dataset of 
products of the three countries2. Each product-observation corresponds to all the 
preparations (different dosages and pharmaceutical forms) of a medicine, marketed by 
one firm at one of the three countries. The moment of entry is that of the entry of the 
first preparation of the medicine on the market and the moment of exit is the time of exit 
of the last preparation on the market. Table 1 shows some descriptive statistics of the 
characteristics of the products that remain constant over the period.  
 On average, the year of firm’s entry is lower in New Zealand. The same happens 
for product entry3 and exit, followed by Portugal. The proportion of medicines that exit 
the market, during the period under analysis, is larger in New Zealand (24.13%), 
followed by Portugal (22.46%) and Sweden (12.58%). New Zealand is also the country 
with the highest rate of non-prescription medicines. That is mainly explained by the 
influence of the Maori traditional medicine (Miller, 2006).  
In table 1, it was also shown the 14 binary variables that indicate the Anatomical 
Therapeutic Chemical (ATC) group of the drug. In the ATC classification system the 
drugs are divided according to the organ or system on which they act (group division) 
and their chemical, pharmacological and therapeutic properties (subgroup division)4. 
                                                
2
 The proportion of products of each country, within the original dataset, remains equal to the sample. 
Data is from: INFARMED – Autoridade Nacional do Medicamento e Produtos de Saúde (Portugal), 
Läkemedelsverket – Medical Products Agency (Sweden) and MEDSAFE – New Zeland Medicines and 
Medical Devices Safety Authority (New Zealand).    
3
 In New Zealand, the average month of entry is 330.21, corresponding to July 1987, and the average 
month of exit is 477.77, corresponding to October 1999. 
4
 The World Health Organization formally adopts the ATC system, which is used worldwide. Drugs are 
classified at five different levels: the 1st level corresponds to the main anatomical group; the 2nd level is 
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There are some differences concerning dispersion through ATC groups, between 
countries, statistically confirmed through a Kruskal-Wallis test (table 2). The test shows 
that the null hypothesis of equality of populations, concerning the distribution through 
ATC groups, is refused by evidence.  
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics (product observations) 
 Total Portugal Sweden New Zealand 
 Obs. Mean Obs. Mean Obs. Mean Obs. Mean 
 
Year of firm’s entry 
 
3543 
 
1974.75   
 
1612 
 
1976.72    
 
986 
 
1978.26   
 
945 
 
1967.71    
 
Month of Entry 
 
3543 
 
394.95    
 
1612 
 
407.22   
 
986 
 
436.93    
 
945 
 
330.21    
 
Month of Exit 
 
714 
 
508.46    
 
362 
 
515.45    
 
124 
 
544.95   
 
228 
 
477.77    
 
If non-prescription drug =1  
 
3543 
 
0.12    
 
1612 
 
0.11    
 
986 
 
0.06    
 
945 
 
0.22    
 
If in ATC group A = 1 
 
3543 
 
0.12 
 
1612 
 
0.12 
 
986 
 
0.11 
 
945 
 
0.11 
 
If in ATC group B = 1 
 
3543 
 
0.07 
 
1612 
 
0.07 
 
986 
 
0.06 
 
945 
 
0.07 
 
If in ATC group C = 1 
 
3543 
 
0.14 
 
1612 
 
0.15 
 
986 
 
0.14 
 
945 
 
0.12 
 
If in ATC group D = 1 
 
3543 
 
0.07 
 
1612 
 
0.07 
 
986 
 
0.04 
 
945 
 
0.10 
 
If in ATC group G = 1 
 
3543 
 
0.06 
 
1612 
 
0.06 
 
986 
 
0.07 
 
945 
 
0.06 
 
If in ATC group H = 1 
 
3543 
 
0.01 
 
1612 
 
0.02 
 
986 
 
0.01 
 
945 
 
0.02 
 
If in ATC group J = 1 
 
3543 
 
0.12 
 
1612 
 
0.13 
 
986 
 
0.10 
 
945 
 
0.12 
 
If in ATC group L = 1 
 
3543 
 
0.05 
 
1612 
 
0.04 
 
986 
 
0.06 
 
945 
 
0.05 
 
If in ATC group M = 1 
 
3543 
 
0.07 
 
1612 
 
0.08 
 
986 
 
0.07 
 
945 
 
0.05 
 
If in ATC group N = 1 
 
3543 
 
0.16 
 
1612 
 
0.14 
 
986 
 
0.18 
 
945 
 
0.15 
 
If in ATC group P = 1 
 
3543 
 
0.01 
 
1612 
 
0.00 
 
986 
 
0.00 
 
945 
 
0.01 
 
If in ATC group R = 1 
 
3543 
 
0.07 
 
1612 
 
0.06 
 
986 
 
0.06 
 
945 
 
0.08 
 
If in ATC group S = 1 
 
3543 
 
0.03 
 
1612 
 
0.03 
 
986 
 
0.03 
 
945 
 
0.04 
 
If in ATC group V = 1 
 
3543 
 
0.03 
 
1612 
 
0.01 
 
986 
 
0.06 
 
945 
 
0.03 
 
 
Table 2: Kruskal-Wallis equality-of-populations rank test 
 Observations Rank Sum 
Portugal 1612 2720185 
Sweden 986 1836348 
New Zealand 945 1707497 
                                                                                                                                            
for the pharmacological/therapeutic subgroup; the 3rd and 4th levels are 
chemical/pharmacological/therapeutic subgroups and the 5th level is the chemical substance subgroup (in 
http://www.whocc.no/atcddd/).  
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Results of the test: Chi2(2) with ties = 20.457; Pr> Chi2 = 0.0001 
 
 We use two variables in order to capture for other differences among countries: 
Population (ln) and GDP per capita (ln). We also use the data on pharmaceutical sales. 
All variables were constructed using figures from the OECD Health Data 2007. This 
dataset has annual observations for the three variables (see table 3). From these, we 
construct monthly series assuming constant growth rates within each year5. In the 
regressions, we use the Neperian logarithm of Population and GDP per capita. On Table 
2, we also show the age structure of the population, in 1990 and 2005. We observe that, 
for Sweden and New Zealand, this structure does not change significantly. In Portugal, 
we observe that the ageing phenomenon is stronger.       
 
Table 3: Macroeconomic Data 
 1990 2005 
 PT NZ SE PT NZ SE 
       
Population (Thousands) 9873 3363 8559 10563 4099 9030 
0-14 years  20.0% 23.2% 17.90% 15.6% 21.5% 17.4% 
15-64 years  66.4% 65.7% 64.30% 67.4% 66.4% 65.3% 
65 and over  13.6% 11.1% 17.80% 17% 12.1% 17.3% 
       
Gross domestic product - Million US$ at X-rate 75391 43799 242129 186277 109778 357503 
Gross domestic product - /capita, US$ x-rate 7636 13024 28289 17635 26782 39591 
Pharmaceutical sales – Million US$ at X-rate 771* 241** 1163 2650 459 3946 
       
Source: OECD HEALTH DATA 2007, July 07 
*Data from 1991; **Data from 1993 
 
     
 
Using the cross-section data, we expand it to an unbalanced panel. The time unit 
is the month. We have 202 months covered by the panel, corresponding to 388679 
observations. Starting from the initial information on entry and exit of the products, and 
                                                
5 We assume that the monthly growth rate of Population, in 2006, is equal to 2005. For 2006, in Portugal 
and Sweden, we assume that the monthly growth rate of GDP per capita is equal to the monthly growth 
rate of GDP. For 2006 in New Zealand, we assume that the monthly growth rate of GDP per capita is 
equal to 2005. For 1990 in Portugal, we assume that the monthly growth rate of Pharmaceutical sales is 
equal to 1991. For 1990, 1991 and 1992 in New Zealand, we assume that the monthly growth rate of 
Pharmaceutical sales is equal to 1993. 
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country, firm, ATC code and prescription type of each product, we are able to construct 
several product-month variables for estimation purposes (see table 4).  
 
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics (product-month observations) 
 Total Portugal Sweden New Zealand 
 Obs. Mean Obs. Mean Obs. Mean Obs. Mean 
 
Age (months) 
 
388679 
 
153.10 
 
171619 
 
139.61 
 
89442 
 
141.41 
 
127618 
 
179.42 
 
No. of Products (national market) 
 
388679 
 
2958.58   
 
171619 
 
3572.17    
 
89442 
 
2227.20   
 
127618 
 
2646.02    
 
No. of Firms (national market) 
 
388679 
 
300.78    
 
171619 
 
408.26   
 
89442 
 
286.33    
 
127618 
 
166.38    
 
No. of Products (own firm) 
 
388679 
 
    45.01 
 
171619 
 
31.94    
 
89442 
 
33.69   
 
127618 
 
70.50    
New Products, last 12 months (own 
firm) 
 
388679 
 
2.70    
 
171619 
 
2.40    
 
89442 
 
3.26    
 
127618 
 
2.73    
No. of Products (own firm, on the ATC-
3 subgroup) 
 
388679 
 
4.70 
 
171619 
 
4.51 
 
89442 
 
4.45 
 
127618 
 
5.12 
No. of Products (other firms, on the 
ATC-3 subgroup) 
 
388679 
 
72.57 
 
171619 
 
100.28 
 
89442 
 
47.46 
 
127618 
 
52.90 
 
With Reference Price 
 
388679 
 
0.62 
 
171619 
 
0.31 
 
89442 
 
0.91 
 
127618 
 
0.82 
With higher 10% reimbursement for 
generics, in Portugal 
 
388679 
 
0.21 
 
171619 
 
0.47 
    
With mandatory substitution for 
generics, in Sweden 
 
388679 
 
0.10 
   
89442 
 
0.42 
  
With public tenders for subsidized 
drugs, in New Zealand 
 
388679 
 
0.21 
     
127618 
 
0.63 
 
Population (ln) 
 
388679 
 
8.87 
 
171619 
 
9.22 
 
89442 
 
9.09 
 
127618 
 
8.24 
 
GDP per capita (ln) 
 
388679 
 
9.71 
 
171619 
 
9.40 
 
89442 
 
10.34 
 
127618 
 
9.68 
 
Pharmaceutical Sales, per capita (USD) 
 
388679 
 
161.96 
 
171619 
 
152.94 
 
89442 
 
301.64 
 
127618 
 
76.20 
 
 We observe that the average age of the products is higher in New Zealand when 
compared with Portugal and Sweden, where they are similar. This is consistent with the 
low average month of entry of New Zealander products. Another interesting figure is 
the number of products, by firm: in New Zealand, it is more than the double of the 
values for Portugal and Sweden. The high number of products, by firm, is a signal of 
high market concentration. It was expectable that New Zealand, due to its geographic, 
political and historical distance, would present different characteristics from those in the 
two European countries. However, we found variables for which Portugal is the outlier. 
Namely, when compared with the other two countries, Portugal has the highest number 
of products, firms and competing products, by ATC-3 subgroup.  
From the log-rank test (table 5), we conclude that there are differences on 
product survival between countries. The log-rank test shows that the null hypothesis of 
being equal the survival function between the three countries is refused by evidence.  
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Table 5: Log-rank test for equality of survival functions 
 Events Observed Events Expected 
Portugal 362 309.58 
Sweden 124 154.94 
New Zealand 228 249.58 
Total 714 714.00 
H0: HPT(t)=HSE(t)=HNZ(t) Results of the test: Chi2(2) = 17.06; Pr> Chi2 = 0.0002 
 
Figure 1 shows the survival functions for the three countries. We observe that in 
Portugal pharmaceutical products have shorter survival spells, followed by New 
Zealand. In Sweden, half of the products survive at least 53 years. However, this pattern 
is not consistent for all survival spells: nearly 85% of the drugs survive at least 108 
months, in Portugal and New Zealand; but only 81% of the drugs survive at least the 
same time, in Sweden. So, we may conclude that there is a higher rate of withdraws on 
younger products in Sweden, but those that survive the first months have longer 
survival spells. We must be aware that this is a very rough analysis, where differences 
between observations, other than life spell at the moment of analysis, are not accounted 
for. For a more accurate analysis, we proceed to semi-parametric estimations.   
 
Figure 1: Survival functions 
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4. Semi-parametric estimations and discussion  
 
 We estimate a duration model to test our main hypotheses. Moreover, we will 
control for characteristics of products, firms and national markets in order to test if the 
differences on product survival, between countries, remain.  
We use the proportional hazard model, with a semi-parametric approach 
(commonly referred as the “Cox’s model”).  
βλβλ XetXt )(),,( 0=  
Using this model, we could estimate the effect of the explanatory variables, X, 
on the hazard rate, ),,( βλ Xt , without having to make any assumptions about the shape 
of the baseline hazard function, )(0 tλ .  
Having two observations (i and j) that are identical but on the value of variable 
x, the interpretation is that the hazard rate of i is )( jix xxe −β  of the hazard rate of j. 
Therefore, we have a measure of the impact of variable x on the hazard rate, called the 
Hazard Ratio (HR).  
)(
0
0
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j
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Left-censure (for products already in the market on the 1 January 1990, time of 
the beginning of the analysis) is accounted for on the estimations. Although Cox’s 
model is appropriate for estimation of continuous time models and that is not the case of 
our data, as our spell lengths are usually several years and there is a relatively low 
prevalence of ties, it is expected that Cox’s model provide acceptable estimation’s 
results (Jenkins, 1995, 2004).  
 
4.1 Estimations for each country, separately 
First, we estimate the duration model for each country. We present two types of 
regressions: regressions (i) include the variable No. of Products (national markets);  
regressions (ii) include No. of Firms (national markets). We do not use the two 
variables simultaneously because the correlation coefficient between them is high 
(superior to 0.97), for the three countries. All regressions include the set of binary 
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variables for the ATC group of the product (not shown on Table 6). With this set of 
variables we intend to control for specificities on survival of drugs that treat different 
organs or systems.  
Table 6: Estimations for each country 
 Portugal Sweden New Zealand 
 (i) (ii) (i) (ii) (i) (ii) 
 
No. of Products (national market) 
 
1.001*** 
  
1.003*** 
  
1.004*** 
 
 (4.79)  (5.94)  (4.80)  
No. of Firms (national market)  1.017***  1.030***  1.046* 
  (6.27)  (5.62)  (1.89) 
No. of Products (own firm) 0.991*** 0.991*** 1.010*** 1.010*** 1.004** 1.004*** 
 (3.23) (3.29) (3.41) (3.48) (2.23) (2.60) 
New Products, last 12 months (own firm) 0.978 0.978 0.941** 0.939** 0.917*** 0.912*** 
 (0.89) (0.90) (2.37) (2.44) (2.97) (3.04) 
Year of Firm’s Entry 1.000 1.000 1.002*** 1.002*** 0.999 0.999 
 (0.07) (0.03) (3.78) (3.84) (1.00) (0.82) 
No. of Products (own firm, on the ATC-3 
subgroup) 
 
0.987 
 
0.988 
 
0.966 
 
0.966 
 
0.976 
 
0.976 
 (1.16) (1.13) (1.55) (1.54) (1.55) (1.52) 
No. of Products (other firms, on the ATC-3 
subgroup) 
 
1.000 
 
1.000 
 
1.007*** 
 
1.007*** 
 
1.008*** 
 
1.009*** 
 (0.55) (0.40) (2.98) (3.05) (3.21) (3.45) 
Non-prescription drug = 1 0.972 0.977 0.750 0.755 0.576*** 0.576*** 
 (0.17) (0.14) (0.52) (0.51) (2.71) (2.71) 
With Reference Price 0.309*** 0.316***   0.554** 0.854 
 (6.59) (7.55)   (2.05) (0.56) 
With higher 10p.p. reimbursement for generics, 
in Portugal 
 
6.633*** 
 
3.557** 
    
 (7.41) (4.93)     
With mandatory substitution for generics, in 
Sweden 
   
0.589 
 
0.764 
  
   (0.73) (0.38)   
With public tenders for subsidized drugs, in 
New Zealand 
     
0.194*** 
 
0.575 
 
    (3.92) (1.44) 
 
Log-Likelihood 
 
 
-1904.776 
 
 
-1892.589 
 
 
-560.036 
 
 
-562.765 
 
 
-1235.533 
 
 
-1247.106 
 
Observations 170007 88459 126676 
Notes: Dependent variable is one if the product exits the market, and zero otherwise. All the regressions include a set of binary 
variables for each Therapeutic Group that are not presented on the table. The results are expressed in hazard ratios. Robust z 
statistics are in parentheses.  
*Significantly different from zero at the 10% level. ** Significantly different from zero at the 5% level. *** Significantly different 
from zero at the 1% level. 
 
 First, we look to the variables that characterize the national pharmaceutical 
markets. For all countries, both the No. of Products and the No. of Firms have a 
negative impact on product survival, as expected. 
The characteristics of the firm that sell the product are accounted for. The results 
differ from country to country. In Portugal, the only characteristic of the firm that is 
significant is the No. of Products (own firm), which has a positive impact on product 
survival. This is consistent with the existence of economies of scale: products from 
larger firms have a survival advantage. For the other two countries, the No. of Products 
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(own firm) has a positive impact on the hazard ratio (one additional product on the 
firm’s portfolio increase the hazard rate by 1%, in Sweden, and 0.4%, in New Zealand). 
Therefore, it seems that, in these countries, products do not benefit from being within 
large portfolios. However, products have a higher survival probability if the firm 
launched any new product in the previous 12 months. Therefore, it does not appear to 
exist any “cannibalization” effect, that is to say that new products do not “expulse” old 
products, from firm’s portfolio. The Year of Firm’s Entry on the market is significant 
only for Sweden and it has a positive impact on the hazard ratio, meaning that products 
of more recent firms have less probability of survival. 
 We use two covariates related with the ATC-3 subgroup of the product 
(corresponding to the second level of classification, the therapeutic main subgroup, and 
noted by one letter and two digits): No. of Products (own firm, on the ATC-3 subgroup) 
and No. of Products (other firms, on the ATC-3 subgroup). The main therapeutic 
subgroup is not the ideal measure of the relevant market for the product, since within it 
there are different levels of substitution. Although, this was the more disaggregate that 
we could get with the data available. The first variable is not significant for any of the 
three countries. The second variable is not significant in Portugal, but it is significant 
and with a negative impact on product survival, in Sweden and New Zealand. More 
close competitors have a negative impact on the probability of product survival, as 
expected. The divergence between Portugal and the other two countries may be a 
consequence of how the public authorities differently exploit their buyer-power over the 
pharmaceutical firms. In fact, for the three countries, the State is the major buyer of 
medicines (directly or indirectly through reimbursement), but only Sweden and New 
Zealand exercise that buyer-power through centralized purchase processes (in Sweden, 
through Apoteket; and in New Zealand, through PHARMAC), which are expected to 
pressure competition between close substitutes.  
 The binary variable that is equal to one if the product is a non-prescription 
product is only significant for New Zealand, where non-prescription products have a 
hazard rate 0.576 times of the hazard rate of prescription products.  
 We may conclude that the effect of market, firm and product characteristics is 
different from country to country. Therefore, not only differenc
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imply different survival rates, de per se, but they also imply differences on other 
variables impact. The results validate hypothesis 1.  
 Finally, we have to interpret the coefficients of the binary variables that account 
for the introduction of the reference price system on each country6. For Sweden, the 
variable is not on regression due to the lack of variability on the explained variable 
before the introduction of the reference price system. In fact, we only have product exit, 
in Sweden, since 1998 and it makes no sense to account for any regulatory introduction 
before that. Therefore, the variable is significant for Portugal and for New Zealand, in 
regression (i), where the introduction of the reference price system increase product 
survival. Therefore, it does not seem to stimulate competition de per se. We may 
conclude that the isolate effect of the reference price system on product survival is as 
established on hypothesis 2, even when we control for the impact of other regulatory 
measures. The other regulatory measures, that are expected to increase competition and, 
consequently, to increase product exit have different effects: the increase of the public 
reimbursement of generics, in Portugal, increased the expected hazard of product exit; 
the mandatory substitution of generics have no impact on product survival, in Sweden; 
and the introduction of public tenders, in New Zealand decreased the expected odd of 
product exit. The results for Portugal and New Zealand show that allowing for repeated 
games for price competition (the Portuguese case) could be more competitive than 
solving the price competition by a one-stage game. 
   
4.2 Joint estimation 
Let us now look to the results of estimations when we add the observations from 
the three countries. On table 77, regressions (I) to (IV) differ on the way we account for 
differences between countries and the regulatory changes in each of the countries. 
Regressions (I) to (III) include fixed effects for the country, through two binary 
variables: If in Sweden = 1 and If in New Zealand = 1 (the default is If in Portugal = 1). 
Regression (III) also includes the Pharmaceutical Sales, per capita. Regression (IV) 
                                                
6
 The reference price system was introduced on December 2002, in Portugal, on January 2003, in 
Sweden, and on July 1993, in New Zealand.  
7
 In table 7, regressions include the variable No. of Firms (national markets). In Annex (table 7-A), we 
show the same regressions substituting the No. of Firms (national markets) by the No. of Products 
(national markets). Results are similar. 
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includes two variables (Population (ln) and GDP per capita (ln)) that intend to capture 
the macroeconomic differences between countries and, simultaneously, to resolve a 
problem of high correlation between the binary variables for the countries (fixed 
effects) and the binary variable With Reference Price. Population (ln) is relatively 
constant within countries, so it works as a country “fixed effect” variable, but GDP per 
capita (ln) has some variability, even within country.  
 
Table 7: Estimations for the three countries 
 (I) (II) (III) (IV) 
 
No. of Firms (national market) 
 
1.016*** 
 
1.017*** 
 
1.027*** 
 
1.016*** 
 (14.93) (7.86) (7.18) (7.56) 
No. of Products (own firm) 1.002** 1.003** 1.003** 1.003*** 
 (2.00) (2.42) (2.53) (2.69) 
New Products, last 12 months (own firm) 0.960*** 0.955*** 0.953*** 0.952*** 
 (3.13) (3.40) (3.56) (3.62) 
Year of Firm’s Entry 1.001*** 1.001*** 1.001*** 1.001*** 
 (3.90) (4.14) (4.29) (4.34) 
No. of Products (own firm, on the ATC-3 subgroup) 0.975*** 0.975*** 0.976*** 0.976*** 
 (3.26) (3.26) (3.25) (3.25) 
No. of Products (other firms, on the ATC-3 subgroup) 1.001 1.001** 1.001** 1.001** 
 (1.56) (2.07) (2.17) (2.13) 
Non-prescription drug = 1 0.753** 0.747** 0.746** 0.745** 
 (2.35) (2.42) (2.43) (2.44) 
If in Sweden = 1 5.183*** 6.046*** 54.879***  
 (10.21) (2.80) (4.36)  
If in New Zealand = 1 85.865*** 266.65*** 1610.703***  
 (12.74) (9.31) (8.38)  
With Reference Price  0.341*** 0.497*** 0.458*** 
  (8.40) (4.44) (5.40) 
With higher 10% reimbursement for generics, in 
Portugal 
  
2.868*** 
 
1.778** 
 
3.047*** 
  (4.44) (2.25) (4.67) 
With mandatory substitution for generics, in Sweden  4.108** 5.676*** 13.422*** 
  (2.51) (3.10) (8.44) 
With public tenders for subsidized drugs, in New 
Zealand 
  
1.636*** 
 
1.299 
 
2.569*** 
  (2.94) (1.48) (5.51) 
Population (ln)    0.008*** 
    (9.29) 
GDP per capita (ln)    0.745 
    (1.02) 
Pharmaceutical Sales, per capita (1000USD)   0.991***  
   (3.78)  
 
Log-Likelihood 
 
 
-4509.923 
 
 
-4452.022 
 
-4444.530 
 
 
-4458.897 
 
 
Notes: Dependent variable is one if the product exits the market, and zero otherwise. All the regressions include a set of binary 
variables for each Therapeutic Group that are not presented on the table. The results are expressed in hazard ratios. Robust z 
statistics are in parentheses. Observations are 385142. 
*Significantly different from zero at the 10% level. ** Significantly different from zero at the 5% level. *** Significantly different 
from zero at the 1% level. 
 
 The first evidence is that the coefficients for the variables, others than country or 
regulatory effects that were used in the previous session do not change significantly 
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between regressions. The No. of Firms (national markets) has a positive effect on 
product withdrawn, as expected.  
 The No. of Products (own firm) has a positive, although small, impact on the 
hazard ratio (one additional product on the firm’s portfolio increase the expected hazard 
rate by 0.2% to 0.3%). It is possible that within larger portfolios intra-firm competition 
is stronger, reducing possible scale effects. Products have a higher survival probability 
if the firm launched any new product in the previous 12 months. Therefore, and as for 
single country analysis, it does not appear to exist any “cannibalization” effect. Looking 
to the effect of these two variables (and also, to the variety of results on single-country 
estimations), we may say that it is not clear which effect is prevalent: scale effects or 
intra-firm competition. In fact, additional products, within the portfolio of the firm may 
induce both effects simultaneously. The Year of Firm’s Entry on the market is 
significant and it has a positive impact on the hazard ratio, meaning that products of 
more recent firms have less probability of survival. 
 The two regressors related with the ATC-3 subgroup of the product are now 
significant. The No. of Products (own firm, on the ATC-3 subgroup) has a negative 
effect on the relative probability of exit (one additional product of the own firm, on the 
same ATC-3 subgroup, decrease the hazard rate by 2.4% to 2.5%). One possible 
explanation is the existence of scope effects. The No. of Products (other firms, on the 
ATC-3 subgroup) is significant and with a negative impact on product survival. More 
close competitors have a negative impact on the probability of product survival, as 
expected.  
 The binary variable that is equal to one if the product is a non-prescription 
product is significant. The hazard rate of non-prescription products is near 0.75 times of 
the hazard rate of prescription products.  
 Looking to regression (I) the coefficients of the binary variables that capture 
country fixed effects give a different perspective from the evidence of the non-semi-
semi-parametric survival functions. In fact, the non-parametric survival functions do not 
allow us to infer if differences derive from differences between countries or differences 
between the products available in each country. When we do not account for market, 
firm and product’s characteristics, Portugal is the country where products have a minor 
probability of survival, followed by New Zealand (see graphic 1). However, when 
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accounting for those characteristics, the scenario is completely different: the country 
with minor probability of survival is New Zealand, followed by Sweden and then 
Portugal. Therefore, drugs with equal characteristics will have different survival spells 
according with the country characteristics. 
 In regression (II), we join the country fixed effects with the binary variables for 
regulatory changes, namely the introduction of the reference price system. We use the 
same variable for all countries, to account for reference price system, despite the 
differences on the design of the system from country to country. Regression (III) also 
includes the explanatory variable Pharmaceutical sales, per capita, which is significant 
and has a negative impact on the expected probability of exit. This result is as expected, 
since markets with higher sales are expected to easily ensure the survival of existing 
products.  
 Regression (IV) repeats the previous exercise substituting the binary variables 
for country fixed effects and the Pharmaceutical sales, per capita, by Population (ln) 
and GDP per capita (ln). The coefficients are as expected: that both variables would 
have a positive impact on drugs survival, although that is only significant for 
Population (ln). This result is consistent with the results from regression (I): as the 
country is more populated, the relative probability of survival for pharmaceutical 
products is larger8.  
Let us now look to the results of the regulatory binary variables on regressions 
(II) to (IV). The binary variable for the introduction of the reference price system is 
always significant. The introduction of the reference price system has not the expected 
effect: it decreases the relative probability of “death” of pharmaceuticals. Therefore, it 
seems that the reference price system does not improve competition, de per se. The 
other regulatory variables have the expected results, increasing the expected probability 
of product exit. These results are consistent with Danzon et al (2004), when they say 
that other measures are necessary to ensure competition pressure that was not achieved 
by the price reference system.   
  
 
                                                
8
 See table 2: Macroeconomic Data. The result for GDP per capita (ln) may be explained by low income-
elasticity of demand for pharmaceuticals. 
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5. Conclusions 
 
In order to study the determinants of pharmaceutical product survival, we 
perform a cross-countries analysis. Our survival model is applied both on separated 
estimations for each country, and on jointly estimations using data for Portugal, Sweden 
and New Zealand. Regulation, market, firm and product characteristics are taken into 
account. 
We draw some methodological conclusions. First, we should be careful when 
extrapolating the results from single-country studies to other countries, because the 
results could vary a lot from country to country. Second, semi-parametric estimations 
can improve substantially the insights on product survival because it allows us to use 
multiple explanatory variables. In our case, the semi-parametric estimations add 
important results to the non-parametric estimation.  
On the subject under study, pharmaceutical product survival, our conclusions are 
not all consistent with previous work. First, we find no evidence of intra-firm 
competition. In fact, it seems that new products do not lead to the exit of existing 
products within the same firm. This is contrary to several studies on other industries that 
show that intra-firm competition is important to explain product survival. Second, we 
find that inter-firm competition is important to explain pharmaceutical product survival: 
competition increases the probability of exit, as expected. Finally, we conclude that the 
introduction of a reference price system do not guarantee, de per se, the improvement of 
competition pressure and the consequent increase of product exit. This result may help 
explain the ambiguous results on the impact of reference price system on competition 
variables of previous papers.      
 
 
Appendix 
 
Table 7-A: Estimations for the three countries 
 (I) (II) (III) (IV) 
 
No. of Products (national market) 
 
1.001*** 
 
1.001*** 
 
1.002*** 
 
1.001*** 
 (15.46) (7.22) (6.92) (7.14) 
No. of Products (own firm) 1.002** 1.003** 1.003** 1.003*** 
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 (2.03) (2.38) (2.44) (2.56) 
New Products, last 12 months (own firm) 0.961*** 0.956*** 0.954*** 0.953*** 
 (3.07) (3.39) (3.52) (3.55) 
Year of Firm’s Entry 1.001*** 1.001*** 1.001*** 1.001*** 
 (4.21) (4.18) (4.29) (4.29) 
No. of Products (own firm, on the ATC-3 subgroup) 0.975*** 0.975*** 0.975*** 0.975*** 
 (3.31) (3.28) (3.28) (3.26) 
No. of Products (other firms, on the ATC-3 subgroup) 1.001* 1.001** 1.001** 1.001** 
 (1.93) (2.12) (2.14) (2.12) 
Non-prescription drug = 1 0.750** 0.746** 0.746** 0.744** 
 (2.38) (2.43) (2.43) (2.45) 
If in Sweden = 1 3.989*** 4.001** 22.638***  
 (9.28) (2.20) (3.71)  
If in New Zealand = 1 3.893*** 16.691*** 17.088***  
 (8.89) (9.85) (9.54)  
With Reference Price  0.296*** 0.365*** 0.376*** 
  (8.33) (6.41) (6.40) 
With higher 10% reimbursement for generics, in 
Portugal 
  
4.535*** 
 
3.160*** 
 
4.357*** 
  (6.53) (4.66) (6.35) 
With mandatory substitution for generics, in Sweden  7.608*** 11.577*** 26.532*** 
  (3.67) (4.36) (9.72) 
With public tenders for subsidized drugs, in New 
Zealand 
  
1.343* 
 
0.977 
 
1.729*** 
  (1.77) (0.12) (3.39) 
Population (ln)    0.079*** 
    (9.88) 
GDP per capita (ln)    0.668 
    (1.39) 
Pharmaceutical Sales, per capita (1000USD)   0.992***  
   (3.27)  
 
Log-Likelihood 
 
 
-4550.081 
 
 
-4461.527 
 
-4456.230 
 
 
-4464.303 
 
 
Notes: Dependent variable is one if the product exits the market, and zero otherwise. All the regressions include a set of binary 
variables for each Therapeutic Group that are not presented on the table. The results are expressed in hazard ratios. Robust z 
statistics are in parentheses. Observations are 385142. 
*Significantly different from zero at the 10% level. ** Significantly different from zero at the 5% level. *** Significantly different 
from zero at the 1% level. 
 
 
 
References 
 
APIFARMA (2002), A indústria farmacêutica em números / The pharmaceutical 
industry in figures, Ed. 2002 
APIFARMA (2008), A indústria farmacêutica em números / The pharmaceutical 
industry in figures, Ed. 2008 
Andersson, K., G. Bergstöm, M. P. Petzold and A. Carlsten (2007), “Impact of a generic 
substitution reform on patients’ and society’s expenditure for pharmaceuticals”, 
Health Policy, 81, 376-384 
Asplund, M. and R. Sandin (1999), “The survival of new products”, Review of 
Industrial Organization, 15, 219-237 
75 
 
Barros, P. and J. de Almeida Simões (2007), “Portugal: Health system review”, Health 
Systems in Transition, 9(5), 1–140 
Bergman, M. A. and N. Rudholm (2003), “The Relative Importance of Actual and 
Potential Competition: Empirical Evidence from the Pharmaceuticals Market”, 
Journal of Industrial Economics, 51(4), 455-467 
Braae, R., W. McNee and D. Moore (1999), “Managing pharmaceutical expenditure 
while increasing access: the Pharmaceutical Management Agency (PHARMAC) 
experience”, Pharmacoeconomics, 16(6), 649-660 
Danzon, P. and J. D. Ketcham (2004), “Reference Pricing of Pharmaceuticals for 
Medicare: Evidence from Germany, the Netherlands and New Zealand”, Forum 
for Health Economics & Policy, 7 (Frontiers in Health Policy Research), 
Article 2 
Danzon, P., Y. Wang and L. Wang (2005), “The impact of price regulation on the 
launch delay of new drugs – evidence from 25 major markets in the 1990s”, 
Health Economics, 14, 269-292 
Danzon, P. and A. Epstein (2008), "Effects of Regulation on Drug Launch and Pricing 
in Interdependent Markets", NBER Working Papers, 14041 
Figueiredo, J. M. and M. K. Kyle (2006), “Surviving the gales of creative destruction: 
the determinants of product turnover”, Strategic Management Journal, 27, 241-
264 
French, S., A. Old and J. Healy (2001), Health Care Systems in Transition: New 
Zealand, WHO Regional Office for Europe on behalf of the European 
Observatory on Health Systems and Policies 
Glenngård, A., F. Hjalte, M. Svensson, A. Anell and V. Bankauskaite (2005), Health 
Systems in Transition: Sweden, WHO Regional Office for Europe on behalf of 
the European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies 
Greenstein, S. M. and J. B. Wade (1998), “The product life cycle in the commercial 
mainframe computer market, 1968-1982”, RAND Journal of Economics, 29(4), 
772-789 
Hosmer, D. W., Jr. and S. Lemeshow (1999), Applied Survival Analysis: Regression 
Modeling of Time to Event Data, Wiley Series in Probability and Statistics 
76 
 
Jenkins, Stephen (2004), Survival Analysis, unpublished manuscript, Institute for Social 
and Economic Research, University of Essex, Colchester, UK 
Jenkins, Stephen (1995), “Easy Estimation Methods for Discrete-Time Duration 
Models”, Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 57(1) 
Kyle, M. K. (2006), “The Role of Firm Characteristics in Pharmaceutical Product 
Launches”, RAND Journal of Economics, 37(3), 602-618 
Kyle, M. K. (2007), “Pharmaceutical Price Controls and Entry Strategies”, The Review 
of Economics and Statistics, 89(1), 88-99 
Lanjouw, J. (2005), “Patents, Price Controls and Access to New Drugs: How Policy 
Affects Global Market Entry”, NBER Working Papers, 11321 
Miller, F. H. (2006), “Consolidating Pharmaceutical Regulation Down Under: Policy 
Options and Practical Realities”, Public Law and Legal Theory WP 06-36 
Moïse, P. and E. Docteur (2007), “Pharmaceutical Pricing and Reimbursement Policies 
in Sweden”, OECD Health WP 28 
Mossialos, E. and A. Olivier (2005), “An overview of pharmaceutical policy in four 
countries: France, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom”, The 
International Journal of Health Planning and Management, 20(4), 291 - 306 
OECD (2008), Pharmaceutical Pricing Policies in a Global Market, OECD Health 
Policy Studies 
Requena-Silvente, F. and J. Walker (2005), “Competition and product survival in the 
UK car market”, Applied Economics, 37, 2289-2295 
Ruebeck, C. S. (2005), “Model exit in a vertically differentiated market: interfirm 
competition versus intrafirm cannibalization in the computer hard disk drive 
industry”, Review of Industrial Organization, 26, 27-59 
Stavins, J. (1995), “Model entry and exit in a differentiated-product industry: the 
personal computer market”, The Review of Economics and Statistics, 77(4), 571-
584 
Virabhac, S. and W. Sohn (2008), “Drug competition and voluntary exit”, Economic 
Letters, 101, 34-37 
Wooldridge, J. (2002), Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data, 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 
 
77 
 
Annex 
Preparation of Datasets and Estimation Strategies 
 
Both for preparation of datasets and estimation, we use the econometric software Stata 
SE (versions 8 and 10). 
 
Essay 1 “Survival of Branded Drugs”  
1) Original cross-section dataset 
The database of INFARMED contains all pharmaceuticals ever marketed in Portugal 
until October 2006. 
The observation unit is drug preparation. The database has 44190 preparations.  
For each observation, we know the following characteristics: 
- The firm; 
- The active substance;  
- The pharmaceutical form;  
- The dosage; 
- The date of market introduction (day-month-year); 
- The state of market introduction authorization (AIM) in October 2006, 30th; 
- The date of the end of AIM, if it is not valid in October 2006, 30th (day-month-
year); 
- If it is a prescription or non-prescription drug; 
- The type of process for market introduction authorization: centralized; mutual 
recognition or national;  
- If it is a generic drug or not, in October 2006, 30th; 
- The date of transformation from branded drug into generic (day-month-year), if 
that is the case; 
- The homogeneous group, if the drug belongs to one (and is under reference 
price); 
- The date of each homogeneous group (day-month-year); 
- The Code of Pharmacotherapeutic Classification. 
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2) Creation of new variables 
For qualitative characteristics, we create binary variables for each category. The 
observation unit is drug preparation. Additional to the variables that characterize drug 
preparations, we create variables for characteristics that are common to all preparations 
of a medicine. Also, we create the variables for “Medicine’s entry” (when the first 
preparation enters the market) and “Medicine’s exit” (when the last preparation exits the 
market, if all exited the market). Then, we drop duplicates for each medicine. The result 
is a dataset with 13647 medicines.  
Then, we generate the variables that change in time. Due to computational limitations, 
we cannot work with daily observations (despite we have daily data). We decide to 
work with monthly data. Therefore, we create the following variables: 
Variable Description 
Entry of Firm (month) The month of entry of the first medicine of that 
firm. 
Exit of Firm (month) The month of exit of the last medicine of that 
firm if all medicines exited the market. 
Products (total) (*) Number of total medicines, in the market, at each 
month 
Products, by Firm (*) Number of total medicines by firm, in the market, 
at each month 
Firms (*) Number of firms, in the market, at each month 
New Products (total) (*) Number of new medicines that enter the market, 
at each month 
New Products, by Firm (*) Number of new medicines that enter the market 
by firm, at each month 
Withdrawn Products (total) (*) Number of medicines that exit the market, at each 
month 
Withdrawn Products, by Firm (*) Number of medicines that exit the market by 
firm, at each month 
% of Generics, by Firm (*) Percentage of generics within firm’s portfolio, at 
each month 
Concentration Index, by Firm (*) Degree of sub-market concentration within the 
firm’s portfolio, at each month 
Monopolies, by Firm (*) Number of sub-markets where the firm is a 
monopolist, at each month 
New Sub-Markets, by Firm (*) Number of new sub-markets where the firm 
enters, at each month 
Sub-Market Exits, by Firm (*) Number of sub-markets from where the firm 
exits, at each month 
Sub-Markets, by Firm (*) Number of sub-markets where the firm is, at each 
month 
New Products=1 (*) If the firm launches new products, at each month 
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Entry in New Sub-Markets=1 (*) If the firm enters in new sub-markets, at each 
month 
Entry in New Sub-Markets=1, if New Products=1 
(*) 
If the firm enters in new sub-markets, giving that 
the firm had launched new products that month 
Time since last launch (*) Number of months since the last launch, by firm. 
 
(*) Those correspond to 202 variables, one for each month. Example: for Products 
(total), we have Products (total)_January1990, Products (total)_February1990, ..., 
Products (total)_October2006 
 
3) Sampling and generating the panel dataset 
After computing the variables of interest, we drop all duplicates for each firm. We also 
drop all the firms that exited the market before January 1990. The result is a dataset 
with 669 firms.  
We transform the cross-section dataset (firm observations) into a panel dataset (firm-
month observations). The panel is unbalanced. We have 82012 firm-month 
observations.  
After, we create new variables:  
Variable Description 
Age of the Firm  Age of the firm, at each month 
If after January 1995 If the month is after January 1995 
If after October 1999 If the month is after October 1999 
If after December 2002 If the month is after December 2002 
 
4) Estimation strategies 
New variables are created lagging market and firm’s variables by 18 months. Because 
of this, we lose observations, using only observations posterior to June 1991.  
The selection regression is estimated by a probit (the dependent variable is “New 
products=1”); then, the results are used to correct the estimations (Heckman procedure) 
of the regression for the variable “Entry in New Sub-Markets=1, if New Products=1”. 
All the regressions included two types of “fixed effects”: time effects, through binary 
variables for each month, and firm effects, through binary variables for each firm. 
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Essay 2 “Product Entry in Pharmaceutical Markets” 
1) Original cross-section dataset 
The same that is used on Essay 1. 
 
2) Creation of new variables 
For some qualitative characteristics, we create binary variables for each category. That 
is the case of:  
Type of prescription: Non-prescription drug = 1 
Type of AIM process: Central Process =1; National Process =1 
Type of therapeutic class: from Therapeutic class 1 = 1 to Therapeutic class 17 
= 1 (Note: INFARMED classifies drugs in 20 Therapeutic Classes (using the “Código 
da Classificação Farmacoterapêutica” - Code of Pharmacotherapeutic Classification). 
Classes 18 to 20 were excluded from database because they were very small and 
residual classes. Observations with no information about Therapeutic Class were 
excluded too. For products classified simultaneously in several Therapeutic Classes, the 
class chosen was the first that appears in database.) 
Degree of innovation: Non-pioneer drug = 1 (if the drug was not the first of the 
chemical substitutes) 
Then, we generate the variables that change in time. Due to computational limitations, 
we cannot work with daily observations (despite we have daily data). We decide to 
work with monthly data. Therefore, we create the following variables: 
Month of entry  
Month of exit (missing, if it is not the case) 
Month of transformation from branded into generic drug (missing, if it is not the 
case) 
After, for each characteristic of the market, firm or product that changes over time, we 
create a variable for each month (between January 1996 and October 2006).  
For example: in the final dataset, No. Products (all market) account for the total number 
of preparations in the month of interest. Then, we create 130 variables: No. Products 
(all market)_January1996; No. Products (all market)_February1996;...; No. Products 
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(all market)_October2006. For example, No. Products (all market)_January1996 count 
the number of preparations, for which the Month of Entry is previous to January of 1996 
and the Month of Exit is posterior to January 1996 or missing. We replicate it for the 
other 129 variables.  
We use this method to create 130 variables (one for each month) for: 
- No. Products (all market) 
- No. Products (own firm): counts the number of preparations, grouped by firm, 
for which the Month of Entry is previous to the month of interest and the Month 
of Exit is posterior to the month of interest or missing; 
- No. Products (own firm, chemical substitutes): counts the number of 
preparations, grouped by firm, active substance, pharmaceutical form and 
dosage, for which the Month of Entry is previous to the month of interest and the 
Month of Exit is posterior to the month of interest or missing; 
- No. Products (other firms, chemical substitutes): counts the number of 
preparations, grouped by active substance, pharmaceutical form and dosage, for 
which the Month of Entry is previous to the month of interest and the Month of 
Exit is posterior to the month of interest or missing, minus the No. Products 
(own firm, chemical substitutes) for that month; 
- No. Products (own firm, therapeutic substitutes): counts the number of 
preparations, grouped by firm and the complete therapeutic classification28, for 
which the Month of Entry is previous to the month of interest and the Month of 
Exit is posterior to the month of interest or missing; 
- No. Products (other firms, therapeutic substitutes): counts the number of 
preparations, grouped by the complete therapeutic classification, for which the 
Month of Entry is previous to the month of interest and the Month of Exit is 
posterior to the month of interest or missing, minus the No. Products (own firm, 
therapeutic substitutes) for that month; 
- If the firm launched products = 1 (in the same therapeutic class) 
- Proportion of generics (own firm): we create an auxiliary variable (No. of 
generics (own firm)) that counts the number of preparations that are generics in 
                                                
28
 The complete classification by the Code of Pharmacotherapeutic Classification identifies note only the 
therapeutic class, but also the therapeutic sub-class. Drugs with the same classification are therapeutic 
substitutes, even if they are not chemical substitutes.  
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October 2006, 30th, grouped by firm, for which the Month of Entry is previous to 
the month of interest and the Month of Exit is posterior to the month of interest 
or missing, and for which there was no transformation or the month of 
transformation was previous to the month of interest. Then, we divide this 
variable for No. Products (own firm), and obtain the proportion.  
 
3) Sampling and generating the panel dataset 
After computing the variables of interest, we delete every drug that was introduced as a 
generic drug and every branded drug that exited the market before January 1996. We 
extract a random sample with 2315 preparations that were introduced in the market as 
brands.  
We transform the cross-section dataset (product observations) into a panel dataset 
(product-month observations). The panel is unbalanced. We have 187832 product-
month observations.  
For each category, the correspondent 130 variables (one for each month) are 
transformed on one single variable. For example: No. Products (all 
market)_January1996; No. Products (all market)_February1996;...; No. Products (all 
market)_October2006 disappear and it is generated the variable No. Products (all 
market)m (the number of products on the market, at month m). 
After, we create new variables: 
- Ageim: the age of the product i at month m (months) 
- Reference Price =1im: if the product i is under reference price in month m 
- Between Sept. 2000 and Nov. 2002 =1m: if the month m is between September 
2000 and November 2002 
- Between Dec. 2002 and Sept. 2003 =1m: if the month m is between December 
2002 and September 2003 
- Since Oct. 2003 =1m: if the month m is since October 2003 
- Transitionim=1: if the month m is equal to Month of exit or Month of 
transformation from branded into generic drug.  
 
 
4) Estimation strategies 
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 4.1) Cox’s model 
We use the data from January 1996 to September 2003, in order to estimate a model 
with only one destination for branded drugs: market exit. From the 2315 brands, 486 
left the market and 83 became generics, during the period under study. The other 1746 
presentations have right-censured durations. Notice that 816 presentations were already 
in the market before 1st January 1996. Those are left-censored observations. Both 
censure types are accounted for in the estimation procedure. 
Data was declared to be survival-time data, with multiple-record per subject. The 
duration variable is Ageim. Failure occurs when Transitionim=1 equals one (within this 
period the only type of “death” is exit from market).   
We use the maximum-likelihood proportional hazard model, for survival-time data 
(Cox’s model).  
 
4.2) Complementary log-log model 
In order to account for the discreteness of data, we also use a discrete time proportional 
hazard model (the). The data is declared to be a cross section of time series (a panel). 
The dependent variable is Transitionim=1. Besides the independent variables used in 
Cox’s model, we also include binary variables for spell lengths. This is the piecewise 
constant specification, assuming that the hazard rate is equal for the same product age 
interval, but different between intervals. Using the exponential form of the results, we 
get hazard rates that could be interpreted in the same way as the results of Cox’s model. 
 
4.3) Multinomial logit 
In a second step, we use data from October 2003 to October 2006, having two 
competing destinations for branded drugs. The dependent variable is mtransition. Since 
October 2003, “deaths” are of two kinds: exits (mtransition=1) or transformations into 
generics (mtransition=2). The base category (mtransition=0) is the maintenance in the 
market, as a brand.  
We cluster observations by product, because we expect that observations are 
independent across products but not within the lifetime of each product.  We estimate 
this model using a multinomial logit framework. 
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Essay3: “Survival of pharmaceutical products: a cross-countries 
analysis  
1) Original cross-section datasets 
Portugal: the same database of INFARMED used on both essays 1 and 2 (cross-section 
of preparation observations).  
Sweden: the Läkemedelsverket’s dataset is similar to the Portuguese dataset (cross-
section of medicines observations). 
New Zealand: the Medsafe’s dataset is similar to the Portuguese dataset (cross-section 
of medicines observations). 
 
2) Creation of new variables 
For Portugal, we take the same steps as for Essay 1 and create a cross-section dataset 
with 13647 medicines. The others datasets already have medicine observations.  
We only use variables that are common to all datasets and create new variables like in 
Essay 2. 
 
 3) Sampling and generating the panel dataset 
Our dataset includes 3543 products, marketed in Portugal (1612 products), Sweden (986 
products) or New Zealand (945 products), between January 1990 and October 2006. 
This set of products is a random sample extracted from the complete dataset of products 
of the three countries, representing 25% of it. The proportion of products of each 
country, within the original dataset, remains equal on the sample.  
Using the cross-section data, we expand it to an unbalanced panel. The time unit is the 
month. We have 202 months covered by the panel, corresponding to 388679 
observations.  
The creation of new variables, within the panel, is similar to Essay 2. 
 
4) Estimation strategies 
We use the maximum-likelihood proportional hazard model, for survival-time data 
(Cox’s model). Estimation procedures are similar to Essay 2.  
